The most important feature of the nomadic empire as a specific type of early, medieval statehood was that its unified organization was essentially reduced to a military one. The military organization, in turn, was shaped by power subordination, which, although it was of a state-political nature, affected the very, very top of the empire. Real general management there was no single Mongol empire.
The bearer of supreme power in the empire was kaan(khagan). The title was borrowed from the traditions of the early Turkic states. It was first adopted by Genghis Khan, but it really took hold as the designation of the ruler of a unified state from about 1210.
In justifying the exceptional position of the kaan, the main role was played by the religious idea: the ruler received power “in the name of Heaven” and acted in the name of His greatness. The basic powers of the ruler flowed from this “heavenly” sanction and were reinforced by tradition. Kaan was considered (1) the head of civil administration - the leader of his own clan, a general tribal leader, judge and priest, and also (2) the head of a military organization. This determined the functions of the nomadic ruler, somewhat different from ordinary states; he is obliged to strengthen the power, take care of the people and (!) support the desire for conquest as the main meaning of the military organization.
In the proclamation of the ruler by kaan great importance had kuriltai- Congress of military and tribal nobility. With the consolidation of the power of Chinggis Khaia, the kuriltai became more of a collection of nobles of his own tribe and the military. After Chinggis, the custom of inheriting power in the clan took root. According to ancient Turkic tradition, power in the empire as a whole was transferred to the youngest son; the eldest sons received their regions as an “allotment” during the lifetime of their father-ruler. Regency (including women-mothers) with a young heir was allowed by law and tradition. The accession to the throne was expressed in a special enthronement procedure, also built according to the ancient Turkic traditions of the first. floor. I millennium: the shamans proclaimed the day, those gathered asked the candidate to take a seat, he refused, he was forcibly placed on the throne, he took the oath. The culmination of the proclamation was the raising of the ruler on felt and hearing his promise to rule justly under the threat of overthrow. The succession of power in individual uluses of the empire was different: the principle of clan seniority prevailed there, and of the 32 known great khans of parts of the empire, only 11 were the sons of the previous ones.
Also, according to the ancient Turkic tradition, the empire was divided into parts that were unequal in state and political terms: the center and the wings. Center(it included the historical regions of the Mongols) was the location of the guards corps (about 10 thousand horsemen) and was considered the domain of the great kaan. Wings divided into right (west) and left (east); the left was considered more important - also according to the ancient nomadic tradition of preferring the left to the right. Additionally, they were designated by colors: blue was preferable to white (Western). The system of wings reflected the military organization: center - right wing - left wing. The wings were divided into tumens (10 thousand horsemen), then into thousands, hundreds and tens, each led by noyons of their own rank. Noyon was not only a military commander, but also a distributor of army lands, booty, the head of a clan or part of it, and partly a judge.
Within the wings, the empire was politically divided into uluses. Initially there were four uluses - according to the number of sons-heirs of Genghis. Then they began to split up. In the uluses, as in the empire as a whole, real state power was exercised on the basis of co-government: at the same time there were two equal rulers of the wings, who consulted with each other (or were at enmity and fought). Sometimes such a co-ruler, if he was not from the Chinggisid clan, received a special title (for example, in the Golden Horde - beklyaribek).
The whole society participates in military development. But it is possible to identify the main elements that form the military system of the state. These include, first of all, 1) the military elements themselves and military command and control bodies, 2) the military economy and 3) the political system. The first group, the actual military elements of the system, includes: the army, navy, border and internal troops, and other military formations. In accordance with Federal Law Russian Federation dated May 31, 1996 No. 61-FZ “On Defense” (Article 1) are distinguished:
The Armed Forces, which consist of central military command bodies, associations, formations, military units and organizations led by the President of the Russian Federation - Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and managed by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation through the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;
Other troops, which means the Border Troops of the Russian Federation, Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Railway Troops of the Russian Federation, troops Federal agency government communications and information under the President of the Russian Federation, civil defense troops;
Military formations, which include engineering, technical and road construction military formations under federal executive authorities, for example, the Federal Aerospace Search and Rescue Administration under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation;
Bodies, which are understood to mean the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, bodies of the federal security service, bodies of the border service of the Russian Federation, federal bodies of state security, the federal body for ensuring mobilization training of government bodies of the Russian Federation. The second group of elements of the military system characterizes the economic component and includes military production: defense industrial production, military production of the Armed Forces and other troops, as well as industrial enterprises and construction organizations of various forms of ownership, including industrial enterprises, construction, trade and other organizations of military ministries and departments (Ministry of Defense, Federal Border Service, etc.), part of transport, communications, Agriculture, other troop infrastructure.
Finally, the military and economic elements function in unity with the political system, which includes government bodies, the media and a system of influencing the personnel of the troops, the formation public policy, preparation of the legislative framework for decision-making in the military sphere and related areas. It is also the political system that formulates the military policy of the state. The military system develops under the influence of internal and external factors. Factors external to the military system are:
Changes in the foreign policy situation, affecting the nature of combat missions and the presence of allies;
Change state system(including the adoption of a new state constitution);
Political transformations within society and the state (political image of federal authorities, the presence of parties and movements),
Economic transformations that significantly affect the military-economic potential and the military-financial system. What happened and is happening in last years with external factors affecting the Russian military system? First, and above all, there was a easing of tensions between the states that were part of the bipolar system that had existed for decades, which was led, on the one hand, by the United States, and on the other, by the Soviet Union.
As a result, the military organization of the Warsaw Pact was liquidated, our troops were withdrawn from the countries of Eastern Europe, negotiations are underway on closer integration of Russia into European structures. Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union into independent states, the formation of a new structure - the Commonwealth of Independent States, which included all the republics former Union except the Baltic states. The formation of economic and military structures within the CIS has begun. Thirdly, there have been fundamental changes in the political system of the Russian Federation.
The main thing that determines the essence of these changes is that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a gigantic state-political force. The function of trade unions has changed (in civilian organizations their role has decreased, but they have appeared in the army as an officially recognized social structure), the content of the work of youth organizations has changed, and there are more of them.
For an organization such as the army, where party-political bodies played a huge role and often acted independently of commanders and superiors, the liquidation of political bodies was a very significant step towards democratization. Fourthly, economic reforms began in Russia, the main content of which was the transition from a planned, strictly centralized system economic relations to the creation of competitive market foundations for farming. This could not but affect military production, which has always been characterized by a rigid centralized control system, and the transition to a market economy naturally affected the military system of the state. The military system was greatly influenced by external factors; it itself underwent radical changes due to the influence of internal, specifically Russian, factors.
The experience of using military structures in past decades forced the Russian leadership, after the events of August 1991, to dismember the once powerful KGB department, controlled only by the Central Committee of the CPSU. It separated the Federal Border Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, units for protecting the President and ensuring the security of state governing bodies. The Armed Forces themselves underwent serious changes. The most trained and equipped military districts and groups of troops of the Soviet Armed Forces ended up outside of Russia (Western Group of Forces, as well as the Kiev, Belarusian and Baltic military districts). In 1992, the actual formation of the Russian army began. Finally, significant changes have occurred in the defense industry.
First of all, this was manifested in a sharp decrease in defense orders, in a reduction in expenses for development work and for the purchase of weapons. Transformations began in the defense complex related to a change in the form of ownership, which, under state control and regulation, continues to this day. All these changes in factors external to the military system itself and changes that occurred within the troops themselves gave rise to very serious problems that have an economic aspect.
All of them require extremely unbiased scientific consideration. What are the main problems in the functioning of the military system of the Russian state at the present stage? The first problem is generated by the contradiction between the economic capabilities of the state and the needs that are requested by the security forces. There is a contradiction in the chronic lack of financial support for the army and navy in recent years. However, different experts and political forces have different assessments of the causes of the shortage. financial resources and, accordingly, they see and offer various ways out of the current crisis situation. What is the actual picture with the financing of our troops?
First of all, it must be said that in states with armed forces, different, but relatively stable, values of the indicator characterizing the share of the military budget in the volume of gross domestic product (GDP) have been established. Thus, currently among Western countries one of the most high level US military spending is about 4.5% of GDP. In other developed countries this figure is 2-4%. In Russia, military spending has been steadily declining over the past decade. The share of military spending in GDP decreased from 11-13% at the end of the 50s (on the scale of the USSR) to 7.2% in 1992 and 5.03% in 1993-1994.
The reduction in military spending in our country began not in 1985, as some opponents of the perestroika processes claim, but in 1989. In the period from 1980 to 1985, the average annual increase in defense spending was positive and amounted to 2.9 billion rubles; in the period 1985 to 1989. (before the peak of expenses) the increase increased even more and amounted to about 3.5 billion rubles. But in subsequent years, a landslide decline began with an average rate of minus 15 billion rubles. in year. (All figures are comparable estimates).
It is important to emphasize that during these same years there was a significant change in the structure of defense spending. The general trend is as follows: the share of expenses for the maintenance of the army and navy increased from 26.1% in 1989 to 54.9% in 1993. This includes the payment of allowances to military personnel, wages civilian personnel, payment of current expenses of troops;
the share of expenses for the creation of scientific and technical products over the same period decreased from 19.7% to 6.7%, that is, almost three times; share of expenses for weapons purchases, military equipment and military property decreased from 42.2% to 16.9%, i.e. two and a half times. What happened to the size of the army and navy?
Over the five years, starting in 1989, the number of Soviet, and then Russian, Armed Forces decreased by 2.8 times, namely from 5.3 to 1.9 million people (excluding other troops and civilian personnel). In the coming years, the number is expected to decrease to 1.5 - 1.4 million people. Firstly, it is necessary to pay attention to the increase in the share of expenses for the maintenance of the army and navy, which has increased, as already noted, to almost 55%.
This indicates the desire of the state leadership to increase the level of socio-economic protection of military personnel and, in connection with this, change priorities in the distribution of severely limited resources. Expenses for payment of allowances have increased significantly. If their share in defense spending in 1989 was 8%, then in 1993 it increased to almost 20%. And this is with a reduction in the size of the army by almost 3 times.
Secondly, very serious contradictions have matured in recent years:
1. On the one hand, the costs of maintaining the army as a whole and paying military officers have increased. On the other hand, the financial situation of the troops' personnel has deteriorated significantly. The situation is especially aggravated by the chronic and ever-increasing housing shortage, the constant increase in the number of homeless and long-term service personnel, which, after the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe, is approaching 150 thousand families according to the Ministry of Defense alone. 2. The share of military expenditures in the gross domestic product is slowly decreasing, which has a painful impact on the implementation of federal social programs - on the one hand, and, on the other hand, results in a catastrophic lack of funds for the production of new weapons, and especially for the development of promising models of military equipment.
Thirdly, we must not forget that in addition to the actual expenditure item called “National Defense”, there are expenditures of a military or “post-war” nature, which include: subsidies to the budgets of closed cities where the Ministry of Defense and Minatom facilities are located, mobilization preparation National economy; law enforcement; elimination of weapons; defense industry conversion. In total, these expenses amount to about 40% of the federal budget revenues. Other data can be cited, but these are enough to understand how difficult the situation is both with the federal budget as a whole and with the financing of the Russian defense sector. The second problem of military construction and the functioning of the military system, which attracts the attention of specialists and the public both in
Russia and abroad, lies in the underdevelopment of the institution of state-political influence on military personnel. In place of the destroyed educational system, a new one did not arise. Moreover, in accordance with Art. 24 of the Law “On Defense” the activities of political parties, as well as other public associations pursuing political goals, as well as the formation of their structures in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies are not allowed, and any political propaganda and agitation is prohibited. Religion immediately rushed here, and various parties began to actively attack the army. The way out of this difficult situation is seen in the creation of a fundamentally new system of state education of military personnel.
It must be based on the traditions of the Russian army and navy, on patriotism and an understanding of the need to maintain the strictest discipline. Now a main department has been created in the Ministry of Defense, the main task of which is the education of military personnel and their moral and psychological strengthening. But the same former political workers work in it, and this makes it problematic to develop a new training for soldiers in the near future. The third problem is a decrease in the combat potential and combat readiness of troops.
Under the influence of many factors, including due to a lack of financial resources, the condition and, consequently, the results of combat training changed for the worse. The fourth problem is related to the shortcomings of centralized command of troops and the lack of civilian control over the security forces, as well as the not always justified closedness of the military system that we inherited from the totalitarian regime.
The fifth problem relates to the sphere of military production. It is due, first of all, to the sharp reduction in military orders from industry, the ill-conceived conversion of military production, the indecisiveness of the state leadership in reforming the military-industrial complex, the recently revealed insufficiently high technological quality of defense industrial production, and the manifestation of the conservative mentality of a significant part of the director corps.
In the context of the economic crisis, the reduction in the provision of financial resources to the defense industry occurred more precipitously than in the funding of troops. It was previously noted that while the cost of maintaining the army decreased by half, the funding for research and development work decreased by almost an order of magnitude. Reducing spending on science and pilot production led to the fact that the number of employees at more than 700 research institutes and design bureaus of the defense industry decreased from 1 million 150 thousand people in 1991 to less than 800 thousand people in 1994. As a result, there is a deterioration in the quality structure of the weapons system, a decrease in the share of modern weapons that are in service with the troops.
Summing up the analysis of the problems that are inherent in the troops and the military-industrial complex as a whole, we can note positive and negative aspects.
To the number negative aspects relate:
The emergence of elements of dissatisfaction among a significant part of the officer corps with the decline in the prestige of military service and the insufficiently high financial situation, the provision of housing, and the uncertainty of military policy;
A decrease in the combat potential and combat readiness of troops, a deterioration in the technical sophistication of the armed forces and a decrease in the share of modern weapons;
Underemployment and even unemployment in the defense complex.
At the same time, there are also positive aspects that characterize the state of the military system and its impact on Russian society:
There has been a significant decrease in the level of militarization of society, although the share of expenditures on security forces in federal budget continues to be very high;
The number of “people with guns” was reduced at the expense of the Ministry of Defense (in a similar way, staffing levels were established for internal affairs agencies, federal security agencies, border service, troops and government communications agencies and tax police agencies);
The transparency in the life of the troops and the adoption of the defense budget has increased somewhat, although the current situation is far from perfect and the established standards for Western civilization. To consolidate the positive aspects of the state of the Russian military system and eliminate negative elements, the need to develop the foundations of the state’s military policy and determine the main directions of military reform is obvious. If at the end of the 80s there was no consensus on the need and possibility of reform, then after 1991 there were no more doubters.
All that is needed is a correct understanding of the essence of the reform, its content, ways and timing of implementation. Legislative support for the military system In a little more than five years of existence of the Russian Federation as an independent state, a huge amount of work has been done by the legislative and executive authorities. As a result, federal laws such as “On Defense” ( latest version adopted by the State Duma on April 24, 1996), “On Security” (as amended on December 24, 1993), “On the State of Emergency” (on May 17, 1991). These documents are of fundamental, fundamental importance, although only one law is brought into compliance with the Constitution of Russia - “On Defense”, and even then, according to the author, with some deteriorations of the 1992 edition. First of all, this consists in keeping silent about the provisions of Article 12 of the 1992 law d. on the limit on the number of military personnel of the Armed Forces.
For military personnel, the federal laws “On the status of military personnel” (as amended on November 24, 1995), “On military duty and military service” (as amended on May 9, 1996), and “On pensions for persons undergoing military service” are of great importance. military service, service in internal affairs bodies, and their families” (as amended on December 27, 1995). In essence, both laws fulfill their purpose by stimulating the recruitment of Russian citizens into the troops. However, there is a significant disadvantage of applying laws such as “On the Status of Military Personnel” and “On Veterans”, which is their insufficient resource provision at the federal and regional levels, as a result of which some provisions turn out to be unimplementable in the near future.
There are norms that cause a negative attitude even from the population. This primarily applies to the right to free travel on public transport, since young people enjoy this right healthy people not the most disadvantaged segment of the population. In addition, not all laws already adopted have a mechanism for their implementation. First of all, this applies to the federal laws “On Veterans” and “On the Status of Military Personnel,” a number of provisions of which are not applied, including due to the fact that in order to implement some provisions of the law, it is necessary to issue resolutions of the federal government or the leadership of the constituent entities of the Federation. In recent years, a number of laws have been adopted regulating the activities of enterprises of the military-industrial complex and issues of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries.
First of all, these laws include the federal laws “On State Defense Order” (adopted by the State Duma Federal Assembly Russia November 24, 1995), “On the conversion of the defense industry in the Russian Federation” (ed. December 24, 1993). It should be noted that issues of defense industrial production are regulated mainly by presidential decrees, decrees and orders of the Government of the Russian Federation. For example, the Decree “On measures to ensure the effectiveness of state control over the privatization of enterprises and organizations of the defense complex” (13.4.96), the resolution “On measures to stabilize the economic situation of enterprises and organizations of the defense complex” (19.12.94). Presidential decrees also regulate conscription into and dismissal from military service, appointment to senior positions and dismissal from service, awarding of state awards and other issues in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, despite some obvious successes in creating a regulatory framework, it must be recognized that a number of laws regulating the military-economic aspects of ensuring the country's defense are urgently needed. First of all, we can name the laws on the military budget (or on the military budget), on the financial and economic activities of troops, on disarmament, destruction and disposal of decommissioned weapons. Currently, the State Duma is actively working on draft federal laws:
“On military reform in the Russian Federation”, which was introduced by members of the Federation Council Committee on Security and Defense and members of the Committee State Duma on Security and members of the State Duma Committee on Defense, “On Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation “On Military Duty and Military Service,” introduced by the President of Russia, “On Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Status of Military Personnel,” introduced group of deputies of the State Duma, “O military police", introduced by deputy V.N. Volkov, a decision was made to create federal law"On the Security Council of the Russian Federation." Legislation providing for military development, military reform and the current vital activity of the troops must and will be constantly intensified and extended to all other areas of economic support for Russia’s national security.
MILITARY THOUGHT No. 5/1993, pp. 12-19
Army and political power
ColonelV.M.RODACHIN ,
Candidate of Philosophy
THE QUESTION of the relationship between the army and political power touches on one of the fundamental problems of state policy, the solution of which determines the nature of development and stability of the socio-political system, power relations and society as a whole. The process of democratic development in Russia and other sovereign states of the former USSR has made all aspects of the relationship between the armed forces and political power extremely relevant.
The army as a guarantor of the stability of political power. Most often, the concept of "army" includes an organized military force maintained by a country for the purpose of defensive or offensive war. It really serves as a kind of “instrument of war,” intended for conducting armed struggle, although today it is increasingly focused on preventing it. In addition, the army is a specific political institution, despite the fact that the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces in its actions proceeds from the requirement to depoliticize the army, which is not a contradiction. “The decrees of the President of Russia on the departition and depoliticization of the Armed Forces will be strictly implemented,” emphasized the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General P.S. Grachev. - Those who cannot live without politics, let them engage in it. But first he must resign from the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces.”
The concept of “politicization” in relation to the army reflects a certain state of it, characterized by the following features!: independent political activity; involvement in politics as an object of struggle between political forces; adherence to any one ideological and political doctrine, party (or an internal split in the army into rival ideological and political groups, factions); combination of professional service with various types political activity among military personnel. The demand for depoliticization of the army means the exclusion of these phenomena from the life of the troops. An extreme view of depoliticization, as the complete isolation of the army from politics, indicates a lack of understanding of its nature, functional purpose, control mechanism, and military practice. Of course, the army cannot be identified with a political institution, since, unlike actual political institutions, it is not directly related to political activity and is not an independent subject of politics participating in the struggle for power and the formation of state policy. At the same time, as an element of state organization and the political system of society, the army is a political institution that performs important political functions in public and international life.
The main one is related to foreign policy state, since it is in this area that the main purpose of the army is realized - to be the guarantor of reliable military security and the national interests of the country. Of much greater interest is the internal function of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, through which their purpose as an element of state organization and political power is revealed. Today, it has become obvious that the army should not interfere in internal political processes, even on the orders of the authorities and in the interests of the state. However, only 27% of surveyed participants in the All-Army Officers' Meeting, held on January 17, 1992, ruled out the legality of exercising the internal functions of the armed forces of the CIS countries. This was due to the fact that the political leadership of the Soviet Union repeatedly used the army in areas of political tension and interethnic conflicts, which caused a negative attitude from the public. Nevertheless, 63% of the officers surveyed were convinced of the need for an internal function for the army. Official developments have appeared and scientific works, exploring its content both in general terms and in relation to the United Armed Forces of the CIS and the RF Armed Forces.
It is appropriate to recall that Aristotle, N. Machiavelli, and other thinkers wrote that the army has always been an instrument of “maintaining power against those who disobey” its will, “the basis of power in all states.” It should be borne in mind that the army does not necessarily carry out its internal function through direct military violence. This option is allowed only in the most extreme cases, when all other methods have not produced the desired results. As a rule, the internal function manifests itself indirectly in the form of the presence of the army in a given territory, its control of key objects, the unshakability of its positions in a particular conflict situation that destabilizes the socio-political situation, and the threat of the use of force.
The internal functions of the army can be ensured different ways and serve the interests of various socio-political forces. Therefore, when manifesting the same function, for example, “serve as a support for power and be a guarantor of the political stability of society,” it can perform “progressive” or “reactionary,” “conservative” or “democratic,” “nationalist,” “national-patriotic” , “internationalist” and other political roles. Numerous examples of internal political struggle in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan and other sovereign states convince us of the ambiguity of the political role of national armed formations, focusing on various socio-political forces.
The main content of the internal function of the Armed Forces consists of supporting the constitutional system, the political power legally elected by the people, preventing mass, and especially armed, anti-constitutional actions of political forces in opposition to the authorities, as well as spontaneous conflicts and clashes that destabilize the social situation. By implementing it, the army is called upon to exercise a democratic political role, to act as a peacekeeping force separating the conflicting parties.
Traditions, the type of political regime that has developed, the degree of its freedom in relations with the authorities, etc. have a significant influence on the content of the army’s functions and the nature of the tasks it performs. The power of traditions in relations between the army and the authorities has always been great. Over the past centuries, some states have developed and encouraged the tradition of subordinating military leadership to civilian authorities. In the United States, for example, in its entire history, not a single general has sent troops to the White House. Any attempts to disobey the authorities or disagree with the policies pursued by the president or Congress ended with the immediate dismissal of the military leaders who dared to do so. This happened to General D. MacArthur during the Korean War and to the hero of the Gulf War, General N. Schwarzkopf. The tradition of subordinating the army to political power has historically developed in Italy. The armed forces practically did not participate in either the establishment or the overthrow of Mussolini's militaristic regime. Before the revolution, Russia also had strong traditions of obedience among military personnel, inspired by the ideas of faithful service to the autocracy and the Fatherland. During the Soviet period, the basis for the relationship between the authorities and the socialist army was the principle of the latter’s unconditional subordination to the institutions of power controlled and directed by the party. Even Stalin's massive repressions against command cadres did not cause protest and resistance to the authorities.
In a number of other countries, the opposite trend has developed. The Spanish military, for example, always showed a certain independence from the authorities and sought to impose the necessary decisions on it. Resisting government efforts to establish tight control over the armed forces, they have repeatedly threatened democracy with conspiracies. And in February 1981, parliamentarians and the cabinet of ministers were held hostage for some time. The tradition of distancing the army from civilian power and political independence has developed especially clearly in most countries of the “third world”, which lack a developed economic, social base, and political system. In these states, the army is the most organized and powerful military and political force, capable of imposing its will on the government or replacing it.
One of the most important factors in determining the relationship between the army and political power is the type of political regime. At totalitarian regime Three models of their relationships are known. The first is “party-totalitarian” (Stalinist regime of power). Political domination is exercised monopoly by the leadership of the ruling party (civil party nomenklatura). The army becomes the most important and completely subordinate, controlled object of party power. The second is “paramilitary-totalitarian” (Hitler’s regime). Political power is in the hands of the ruling party elite, which constitutes either an organic component of political power or the most powerful and influential force of pressure on it. The army is both the central object of political power and its partial subject. The third model is “military-totalitarian” or “stratocratic” (from the Greek “stratos” - army). In it, the army pushes aside the political party and exercises sole (monopoly) political leadership. Under this regime, the usual authorities are abolished or replaced by the military. For example, the regime of the Brazilian “gorillas”, established in March 1964, declared in Institutional Act No. 1 of the Supreme Revolutionary Command that “a victorious revolution legitimizes itself as a constituent power.” On this basis, the president, 6 state governors, 46 members of the Chamber of Deputies, and 4,500 employees of federal institutions were removed from power. In all models, the army served as the most important support of totalitarian power and was the guarantor of the order established by it. Since its goal was to ensure complete and universal control of power over all aspects of state, public and even private life, the political role of the armed forces could not but be exclusively reactionary - gendarmerie and repressive-militaristic.
The authoritarian regime of power includes the following models: “civil-authoritarian”, “semi-military-authoritarian” and “military-authoritarian”. The army in them occupies the position of an object completely subordinate to authoritarian power. Despite the external similarity of the models of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of power, the political role of the army has significant differences. An authoritarian regime, while representing strong state power, does not extend its influence to all spheres of public and private life. It allows a certain freedom for political institutions, including political parties and some public organizations. The principle of separation of powers does not actually apply, even if there are formal structures of legislative, executive and judicial power. It is concentrated in the hands of a monarch, dictator or small authoritarian group.
The political role of the army is not always reactionary. It can also be patriotic, peacekeeping (preventing class clashes, civil war), consolidating social forces and strengthening the integrity of the state. If an authoritarian regime is a transitional form from dictatorship to democracy, the political role of the army has a clear democratic orientation. Almost always, successful economic and political modernization was ensured by the support of the army (Spain, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea). She helped the authoritarian government, aimed at reforms, launch a fight against corruption and the machinations of officials, mobilize all the country's resources, carry out market reforms and forcefully suppress the protests of those sections that tried to hinder them. This is how the authoritarian-military regime of Park Chung Hee, which established itself in February 1961 in South Korea, acted. As a result, the foundations of the country's current prosperity were laid, although its political system is not yet fully democratic.
In a democracy (democratic regime), there is a special model of effective civilian control over the armed forces, based on the unconditional recognition by the military of the supremacy of civilian political power. It is not unified and has many options for practical implementation. This takes into account national specifics, applied mechanisms of civilian control, etc. The extreme version of civilian control involves the complete removal of the army leadership from direct access to the highest political leadership, especially the president, and military personnel from any participation in politics, which can result in alienation army from power and the virtual lack of control over the actions of military leaders. In this situation, people are discriminated against, or even completely ignored. civil rights military personnel.
The “American” version of civilian control is as follows. Firstly, Congress is given the right to discuss and approve the military budget, demand a report from senior military officials on the situation in the army, issue charters and instructions regulating the actions of the troops; secondly, the civilian Ministry of Defense, where the minister and his deputies are civilians, exercises direct military-political control of the troops; thirdly, the political rights and freedoms of military personnel are limited by significant legal prohibitions.
The “German” version of civilian control differs primarily in that, in addition to the legislative rights of the parliament, a special institution of the Bundestag Commissioner for Defense is established “to protect fundamental rights and as an auxiliary body of the Bundestag in the exercise of parliamentary control.” He is elected by parliament for a period of 5 years and is subordinate only to it, having great powers. In addition, the Minister of Defense is a civilian, while his deputies and other army leaders are military. The political leadership's trust in them comes from the desire not to undermine the effectiveness of military command. Finally, military personnel are considered "citizens in uniform." They are guaranteed equal rights, including joining political parties (it is prohibited to act in the interests of the party in the service), participation in political events outside of work. Propaganda, political speeches, distribution of printed materials, combining service with parliamentary activities.
The desire to create effective civilian control over the Armed Forces was also expressed by the Russian political leadership. So far, only its outlines have been outlined: parliamentary control, which provides, according to the Law of the Russian Federation “On Defense”, the right of the Supreme Council of Russia to adopt military doctrine, approval of the military budget, determination of the structure and size of the Armed Forces, consent to the appointment of the highest military command, the decision to use the armed forces for abroad; separation of government bodies and functions related to the civilian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff; departition of the Russian army; a legislative ban on her interference in politics. It will take a lot of time before the mechanism of civil control is debugged in all details, and most importantly, it works effectively.
This control will contribute to the army's political role or, as the Italian constitution says, "to be consistent with the democratic spirit of the Republic." This will find its real expression in supporting the government legally elected by the people, protecting, as Article 8 of the Spanish Constitution states, the constitutional system and order, and ensuring the stability of the socio-political situation. It should be emphasized that the stabilizing role of the army is not limited to a forceful reaction to actions that threaten society from the inside, fraught with “much, senseless blood.” It ensures the stability of society by its non-participation in political struggle, the absence of party sympathies and antipathies, the inability to use it for political and other purposes, the firmness and consistency of its political positions, focused on supporting the law, state principles, legislative and governmental power.
However, it should be recognized that the army does not always manage to play a stabilizing, as well as democratic role. In a number of cases, she independently intervenes in politics and becomes an active subject of power relations.
Military coups and political activity of the army. In countries where the popular consciousness has formed an opinion about the “need for a strong hand,” the army entered the political arena, identifying its power with the strength of political power. This especially applies to developing countries. IN Latin America Over the past 150 years, there have been over 550 military coups. Bolivia alone withstood 180 military coups from 1825 to 1964. Military dictatorships ruled for a long time in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile.
In February 1992, they tried unsuccessfully to take power in Venezuela. The military demonstrated its influence during the political crisis in Peru, where on April 5, 1992, President A. Fujimori dissolved parliament, put a group of its leaders under arrest and suspended some articles of the constitution. The army's strong support for the president's actions allowed him to control the situation and decisively implement his program to overcome the “constitutional impasse.”
In Asia, the military is an active participant in political struggle. According to G. Kennedy, during the period from 1945 to 1972, 42 military coups took place there. And in the future, their activity in this part of the world did not decrease: coups in the Philippines, Fiji (1987), Burma (1988), Thailand (1991). In a number of countries - Sri Lanka, Burma, Pakistan, South Korea - the army is a powerful political force, and senior military officials are an integral part of the government. In Iraq, after the military coup (1978), one of the most repressive regimes of Saddam Hussein remains.
Africa also remains a stable zone for military coups. From 1948 to 1985, 68 heads of state and government were removed from power. The military seized power in Nigeria and Liberia (1985), Lesotho and Uganda (1986), Togo and Somalia (1991). In January 1992, under pressure from the military, Algerian President Bendjedit was forced to resign by signing a decree dissolving parliament. In May of that year, the armed forces overthrew Sierra Leonean President Joseph Momoh.
The military also demonstrated quite high activity in the political life of some European countries. For example, in Greece over the past 50 years there have been 11 military coups. There have been 52 military coups in Spain since 1814, including the last two attempts (in 1978 and 1981) under democratic rule. The Portuguese armed forces played a decisive role in the April 1974 Carnation Revolution, which ended the fascist regime. The French army challenged the government in 1958 and 1961. In Poland, in the context of a growing political crisis, President W. Jaruzelski, with the help of the army, implemented a state of emergency. The role of the force trying to preserve the integrity of the federal statehood in Yugoslavia and suppress the separatist movements was assumed by the Yugoslav People's Army. Many political leaders and publicists regarded the events of August 19-21, 1991 in the former Soviet Union as a military putsch. However, an objective and comprehensive analysis shows that, firstly, this was precisely an attempt at a coup d’etat, in which government and party structures became the main organizers. Secondly, only part of the senior command and political leadership, drawn into the plans of the conspiracy, sought to use the army as a strike force. The findings of the commission of inquiry into the participation of the Armed Forces in the coup d'état and the parliamentary hearings in the Supreme Soviet of Russia, held on February 18, 1992, confirmed that the army was predominantly on the side of the domocracy. “The army did not go against its people,” Air Marshal E. Shaposhnikov noted in the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the CIS, “did not raise weapons against them, the composure of the majority of generals, officers, army and navy personnel, their balanced assessments of the events unfolding in the country did not allowed the August coup to have an unpredictable result.”
Awareness of the inadmissibility of military participation in politics by force was reflected in the tendency to gradually remove them from the political struggle, which was noted at the Madrid conference of political scientists in 1990. However, it is premature to declare it “dominant in the 20th century” and to assert that in Europe this process “ended long ago”, and in “Latin America it is approaching a complete and irreversible end.” As for Europe, it is not limited only western part, where since the beginning of the 80s there have really been no attempts at military coups or other forms of army intervention in the struggle for power. With the collapse of totalitarian structures and the rise of democratic and national movements in the countries of Eastern Europe and the states located in the European part of the territory of the former USSR, the likelihood of military intervention in power relations has increased. It has already become a reality in Yugoslavia, partly in Poland and Romania. In Latin American countries, the frequency of military coups has noticeably decreased. But there are no serious grounds for concluding that in the future they will be completely excluded. To do this, the causes that give rise to them must be eradicated.
The likelihood of direct military intervention in politics increases significantly in an environment of deepening social and international instability, especially when governments and other power structures lose control over the development of events and find themselves unable to take and implement effective measures. It has long been observed that military personnel almost always support a well-functioning civilian government. And vice versa, one of the stable factors pushing them to prepare and carry out coups is a weak, incompetent government. Therefore, it is impossible to give an absolute guarantee that even the most stable countries of Western Europe today will be able in the future to avoid a period of destabilization of social or international life that could provoke a military coup.
According to the conclusions of leading Western political scientists, for example J. Lepingwell from the University of Illinois, such situations most often arise in so-called systemic conflicts that pose a threat to the fundamental interests of society, national security, sovereignty and integrity of the state, the constitutional order and public order. Traditionally, the army acts as a guarantor of socio-political stability and integrity of the state. Defending security interests, it considers itself a force responsible for preventing civil strife, preventing chaos, anarchy, and the collapse of the country. Its motto is “Politics belongs to the parties, but the Fatherland belongs to the army.” A detailed study by T. Horowitz, dedicated to identifying the reasons for the involvement of the Sri Lankan officer corps in the preparation and execution of military coups, shows the influence of precisely these factors causing systemic conflicts. Their effect is taking place and, moreover, is intensifying in Russia and the CIS. The main causes of concern are the further decline of the economy, the deepening of inflationary processes, multiple increases in prices, and the threat of mass unemployment. Economic instability is complemented by worsening political contradictions and interethnic conflicts. In Russia, an intense struggle continues around the problems of government, the adoption of a new Constitution, the distribution of power between legislative and executive bodies, the center and the constituent entities of the Federation. After the proclamation of the sovereignty of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tuva, and Chechnya, the danger of Russian disintegration remains. There has been a tendency for a number of states to lose interest in strengthening the Commonwealth. The collective security treaty was signed by representatives of only six states - Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Bishkek, unfortunately, did not become the birthplace of the new confederation.
This development of events is not only painfully perceived by many military personnel, especially personnel, but also significantly affects their interests. All this could become a powerful incentive for the army to intervene in politics, which a certain part of the public is looking forward to. A telephone survey of public opinion leaders at the end of March 1992 showed that 10% of them were confident that the military would replace the Democratic team. A strong provoking factor here is severe social status military personnel and members of their families, the oppressive situation of the growing split, discrimination based on nationality, the increasing incidence of unpunished attacks on soldiers and officers, the sad result of which is the death of many of them. The authorities' insufficient attention to the army's increasingly complex problems also contributes to its politicization. More than once, resolutions of officer meetings have expressed an unprecedented requirement for army public structures for the governments of CIS states to take into account the interests of military personnel. The tension potential accumulating in the Armed Forces may eventually reach a critical mass.
Seeing the army as the “savior of the state and the nation,” many ordinary people and some theorists take as a model the results of the coup of the Chilean junta in 1973. And if until recently the name of General Augusto Pinochet was a symbol of reaction and dictatorship for everyone, now it takes on the exact opposite meaning and is associated with the success of social reforms and the dynamism of the Chilean economy. Of course, this experience is indicative, but in many ways unique. For 16 years established mode The military junta managed not only to overcome the state of crisis and instability in which society was located, but also to create the necessary preconditions for its further development through the privatization of almost all production (with the exception of the copper mining industry and air transport), external debts, healthcare, education, as well as - for the first time in world practice - social security.
And yet, stratocracy in any form, according to the conclusion of most political scientists, is ineffective as a form of government and regime of power. First of all, because governing the state is ultimately not the job of the army. This requires special knowledge and skills. Moreover, the more developed a society is, the less acceptable a command style of management is. Tightening discipline, responsibility, and other measures of “restoring order” that the army is capable of implementing can only give a short-term effect, since they will not eliminate the root causes of the social crisis. The military regime established as a result of the coup, according to S. Feiner, will not be able to secure sufficiently broad and strong support in society necessary for carrying out reforms. It is impossible to achieve civil consent through military methods. They also do not stimulate the labor activity of citizens. The absolutization of power by the military turns against the army itself. “As soon as the military in a certain state has lost its political virginity,” writes W. Gutteridge, “military discipline falls and the professional tradition of recognizing the authority of power dissipates.”
Based on the above, the following conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the army is not only a military, but also a political institution of society, an important instrument of state policy, a guarantor of security, integrity and stability of the political system and society as a whole. By its nature, its political role can be negative. It is impossible to achieve complete depoliticization of the armed forces. The division of the army is acceptable and necessary. Secondly, the relationship between the army and political power is complex and contradictory, determined by many factors. Depending on specific circumstances, there may be different “models” of the relationship between the army and the government. The model of civilian control over the armed forces meets the requirements of civilization and democracy. Thirdly, in conditions of socio-political instability and the development of crisis processes, the army is capable of entering the political arena as an independent political force, including preparing and carrying out military coups and establishing a stratocracy - direct military rule. Fourthly, military coups are an unacceptable form of resolving socio-political crises in modern conditions. The state and society must do everything to keep the army from directly interfering in politics.
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The army is traditionally viewed How derivative, How a kind of cast of the social system that gave birth to it. At the same time, it has not been sufficiently studied as a social force that seriously influences social life under certain circumstances. The armed forces are a special-purpose state military organization capable of waging war and armed struggle at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. In a political science sense, it is an institution of the state, an element of its mechanism, intended to carry out policy by means of armed violence 107.
Relying on the ability of the army to wage war, armed struggle, the state uses it as an instrument of policy, foreign and domestic. A military organization is a system of state and public organizations created by the ruling elite to ensure their economic and political dominance. It is intended to implement all forms of armed violence against political opponents. Military organization includes only those armed and political institutions that are directly related to armed struggle in the name of achieving political goals. It is this criterion that makes it possible to distinguish a military organization from other armed organizations not directly related to the war (internal troops, police, etc.), and from institutions that ensure or facilitate the functioning of a military organization (military-industrial complex).
The armed forces have traditionally been included in the military organization of our country as its core; in addition to the armed forces, the military organization has included troops ensuring state security, civil defense units and formations, and military registration and enlistment offices. In war conditions, it included military party detachments, workers' militia, civil uprising, destroyer battalions, partisan detachments 108.
In recent military-philosophical literature, such essential qualities of the armed forces as class essence 109, historical purpose, and a set of characteristic features 111 or elements 112 have been somewhat tendentiously analyzed. Scientists, having established the necessary and sufficient generic and specific characteristics of the army, revealed its essence and examined its characteristic qualitative properties. So, for example, Yu. V. Mamontov focused on the fact that the army is part of a specific society, a social institution deliberately and consciously created by classes and states; a weapon for waging war by states, classes, nations in the name of achieving certain goals; an organic part of the political organization of society, which has its own specifics
With the classical Marxist division of armies into bourgeois, socialist and armies of developing countries, much attention in the literature was paid to increasing the role of the army in the capitalist world. At the same time, they identified such forms of manifestation of the internal functions of the bourgeois army as interference in the political activities of the state in various spheres; participation in political actions against the population; sabotage, subversive and military-judicial actions 1 U. These manifestations of internal functions were defined as the direct physical impact of the army on the solution of internal political problems.
When characterizing the army of the modern Russian state, one can, by analogy, to a certain extent use the features of the social assessment of the armed forces of developing states. Moreover, this analogy is caused not by the above-mentioned classification of states, but by the quality of the processes of the developing state organism, including the underdevelopment of the social class structure of society, its low structure, the absence of a clear social niche for the army; underdevelopment of political institutions, lack of democratic traditions and civilian control over the power mechanism, including the army; special organization, discipline and controllability of the army in comparison with other institutions. Unlike the armed forces of developing states, along with obvious advantages, the Russian Army has a significant socio-psychological flaw. In developing countries, the army is a powerful national institution in which representatives of various tribal and social groups unite; they recognize themselves as military intelligentsia, members of one national family, and service in the army itself instills in them a national identity. The military personnel of the Russian Armed Forces are under the influence of a significant number of negative factors, which include the unjustified hopes of the majority of the population for the army as a stronghold of unity within the union state; unsuccessful military operations on the territory of the country; unfavorable moral and psychological situation in many military groups; low level logistics and financial support; legal vulnerability of various categories of military personnel in matters of asserting their rights in accordance with current legislation. The list can be continued further. But I would especially like to note that in the country and, most importantly, in the army at the moment there is no single national idea that can unite people. Along with other factors, it is the national idea that makes the army the most influential institution in society and gives it an advantage over other organizations that are often connected only by narrow group interests.
It is well known that the level of development of material production determines the availability of financial resources, the possibility of spending on maintaining the armed forces and maintaining their combat power. Recognizing this dependence, it is quite difficult to answer the question of how a country in a deep economic and periodically political crisis can maintain a modern army and ensure its defense capability.
The possibility of solving this problem is revealed in several planes.
Firstly, in modern conditions, the influence of material production on the military-technical base goes beyond the narrow territorial boundaries of the country in which it is located. Qualitative transformations in the military-technical base can occur not only in economically powerful countries, but also in countries with a relatively poorly developed material and technical base. This is possible due to the existence of economic and military-political alliances, within the framework of which military-technical assistance is provided, as well as on the basis of international arms trade. For our state, this path is unlikely and unsuitable, since on the one hand, the currently available military potential allows us to deliver a powerful retaliatory strike to any enemy, and on the other, the remnants of the domestic military-industrial complex are also still capable (with appropriate support) of providing weapons supplies and equipment of the required quantity and quality.
Secondly, ensuring the security of the state is greatly facilitated by political options for solving the problem. This includes a reduction in international tension at its most different options in connection with the refusal to confront the cold war, concluding a number of agreements at the international level. This is also a reasonable reform of the Russian Armed Forces, the entire power mechanism of the state in accordance with the capabilities and the need for an adequate response to dangers and threats to national interests.
Analysis of the place and role of the army as the main component of the power mechanism of the state involves considering it in a larger structure, which is the political system of society. On the one hand, this view corresponds to modern realities, when the armed forces have entered into broad interaction not only with government bodies, but also with all other institutions of the political organization of society, which is important for the functioning of both the former and the latter. On the other hand, the modern appearance of the armed forces, their condition, and functioning must be brought into line with the needs of modern social development. And for this it is not enough to use the influence and capabilities of the state alone, although this influence is decisive. This influence cannot be limited to the state, which was possible in earlier times. The entire power mechanism, including the armed forces, is increasingly influenced by elements of civil society, which become more real as they manifest themselves characteristic features legal state.
Determining the place and role of the army in the political system of society requires revealing the factors that determine its special position in the system of political relations. And it lies, first of all, in the fact that the army is closely connected with consciously organized military-political relations, determined by the economy, state policy, and the dominant ideology, therefore it is a participant in the political life of the country, the bearer of military-political relations. The organic connection of the army with the politics of (state) power and the direct or indirect relation to its conquest, retention, use and growth is not only a distinctive, but also a characteristic feature. Characteristic sign- this is the ability of the army, as V.I. Gidirinsky emphasized, to simultaneously meet two requirements: to be and act as a subject of military-political activity; serve as an instrument of military-political activity of classes 115.
The position of the army as the main support of the political system of society characteristic of states transitioning from dictatorship to democracy.
Moreover, in the first option, the army, along with other elements of the political system, acts as a subject of the political process, an instrument for managing society and largely determines who is in power. With purposeful progress towards democracy, the second option arises - the army remains only a management tool. The third option involves the exclusion of the army from the management of society and its performance of the function of protecting the state from military danger from the outside. This is what characterizes the interaction of the army with the political system of a democratic society. “In this case, the army plays the role of a kind of insurance policy, it may be involved in the fight against unrest and organized crime, but power itself is based mainly on the authority of the political system, voluntary support, discipline and civic activity of the population" 6.
The army, together with other security agencies, plays a role the main pillar of the political system in cases where it is the main instrument of management or takes power itself, which is typical for totalitarian, for example, former fascist states, as well as for military dictatorial regimes in developing countries. The powerlessness of the ruling regime or dictator is revealed immediately when the army is “withdrawn” from the political system. This is one of the reasons for the accelerated militarization of society, through which the ruling elite is increasing its influence. Formally, the military organization becomes a role model for parties, political organizations, movements, but in essence the entire way of life is militarized, the military receives a much higher status than civilians.
In general, it can be noted that all structural components of the political system interact with the armed forces, influence their functioning, and are influenced by this important body of the state. Therefore it turns out that functional role army depends, firstly, on the place occupied by the army in the structure of political institutions of the state and society; secondly, on the degree of complexity and mobility of the system of political relations in which the army organism is embedded; thirdly, on the level of development and functioning of legal norms in the state and political norms in society and, fourthly, on the level of political public and individual consciousness.
The army is an object legal regulation on the part of the legislative body that adopts the constitution, laws, and other acts that formulate the norms for the creation of the armed forces, determine their composition and general system, the principles of higher military command, the rights of various state institutions and officials to lead troops and use them both within the country , and abroad "7. The law determines the principles of manning the armed forces, terms of service, the procedure for selecting and training command personnel. With the consent of parliament, the number of troops is established and changed, powerful and expensive weapons systems are adopted. The legislative body approves annually the military budget, makes decisions on the military bloc policy and issues other important documents defining the purpose, tasks, role and place of the army in society.
Along with the legislative bodies, the institution of executive power has a strong influence on the armed forces. Government structures put into practice articles of the constitution and other laws relating to military issues, develop and implement the main directions and principles of military development, select and appoint military personnel to high positions, and are responsible to the legislature for the combat readiness of troops and their morale. The Constitution of the Russian Federation emphasizes that the Government of the Russian Federation “... carries out measures to ensure the defense of the country, state security, implementation foreign policy..." 118.
Executive authorities control the activities of the Armed Forces and issue orders for their use both within and outside the country. Governments are preparing draft military budgets, treaties and agreements on military bloc policy.
The Constitution of the Russian Federation defines the relationship of the president with the military departments, his role in military policy as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the country's Armed Forces. The President approves the military doctrine of the state, forms and heads the Security Council, appoints and dismisses the high command of the Armed Forces, and has special powers in situations where it is necessary to use security forces, including the Armed Forces. In the event of aggression or an immediate threat of aggression, he introduces martial law on the territory of the state or in its individual regions" 9.
To develop the identified issues, as well as the strategy of the Armed Forces, special bodies are created under the government and the president. The Security Council coordinates and controls national security policy. He is given the right to prepare draft regulatory documents intended to ensure national security policy. The interdepartmental commissions of the Security Council and the working bodies they create on a collegial basis develop agreed proposals on the most important issues of a strategic and conceptual nature for presentation to the President of the Russian Federation.
The army as an organ of the state is woven into a complex multi-level system of political relations. These are relations within the state - between various branches of government, between various ruling groups. These are relationships manifested in the interaction of state and society, state power with various political forces. This is the relationship of the army itself with the state, society, individual social strata, and the people as a whole. We can also talk about including the army in the most various forms into interstate relations. The activities of the army as a participant in interstate relations are not independent; they are sanctioned by the state. If the army manifests itself as a subject of international relations, then this happens in cases where it leaves the subordination of the state. In this case, the army itself either performs the functions of the state or ceases to exist as government agency. It is possible to imagine the existence of a state without an army, but it is hardly possible to have an armed force without a state.
The relations that develop within the state itself between the various branches of government are more stable and predictable, since a well-developed legislative framework presupposes the appropriate nature of these relationships and, in a stable socio-economic and political situation, no contradictions arise, the resolution of which requires the use of force in the form of the army . However, in times of crisis in the development of society, during transitional periods of the formation of new political systems and the search for new forms of government, contradictions can intensify, the temptation arises to use the armed forces on one side or the other, and the army finds itself hostage in the intricacies of the political game. In the same way, the political weight of the army is used in the struggle of political groups around the head of state (president or prime minister) or in situations where the head of state strengthens his position by appointing a person to the post of defense minister who does not enjoy authority among the military, but but “personally devoted.”
A more complex, multifaceted and contradictory character is the participation of the army in the relationships that develop between the government and society, various social groups and political parties.
As a rule, the relationship between society and the state is built through connections that are organized by various public and political organizations. In their most civilized and developed form, these relations are created by trade unions and political parties. The role of political parties in the process of establishing connections between society and the state is significantly increasing in the conditions of the emergence of market economy, since trade unions are mainly focused on interaction with employers and to a lesser extent on interaction with the state, although this aspect is also important for them during the period of adoption of legislative acts that are important for employees.
Political parties not only play the role of mediator between society and the state, but are also a direct subject of the process of changing political elites; they lay claim to state power. That is why it is important to note the possibility and degree of influence of such an institution of the political system as a party on the armed forces of the state.
Each political party that aspires to a serious role in politics, and even more so to power, develops its own program for the military security of the state, the construction and use of armed forces, and the protection of the interests of the military. The army often plays a decisive role in conflicts between branches of government and ruling groups, as well as in the interaction of government with society and various social and political groups. Moreover, the army can say its weighty word in support of the authorities, a separate group, or act on the side of the opposition.
World experience shows that a variety of political parties are trying to establish contact with the armed forces, using open and hidden forms of struggle for influence, power and control over them: the harsh monopoly influence of the ruling political party on the army with the official departition of the armed forces; secret penetration of parties into the army in conditions of pluralism of ideology and politics. At turning points in history, during mass political campaigns, a struggle between parties and movements for the army arises. Dictatorial regimes establish a strict monopoly of power on the power structures of the state. The party in power subjugates the army with the help of the state, blocks access to it by other political forces, exerting political, legal, ideological, and moral-psychological influence on the armed forces.
In a situation of departitionization, military personnel are not allowed to be members of party organizations and perform any work in their interests. Of course, it is impossible to completely break ties between the army and political parties - they are becoming more indirect. This form of relations with actual de-partization is typical for countries with a long democratic tradition.
The Armed Forces are not an independent element of the political system; they are included in it through the state, of which they act as an organ.
A specific feature of the army is that it is an organization of armed people and performs its functions with its inherent armed means. Combat power and combat effectiveness are the main characteristic of an army, an expression of its main quality.
The fact that the army is an integral attribute of the state does not mean the absence of its relative independence in relation to the state. Unlike other bodies of the state, the army is organized detachments of armed people, equipped with special weapons and equipment for conducting combat operations with the enemy. The specifics of the army indicate that it has its own “logic of life.” Along with the general ones, it has specific laws of construction, life and combat activity. As a relatively independent social phenomenon, the army has a reverse active influence on the state and the entire political life of society.
The problem of identifying the place of the army in the political system and its relationship with civil society are being considered, and quite actively. In the book of American political scientist Samuel Ha ntangtona“The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations” devotes an important place to the problem of civilian control by society over its Armed Forces. As the author points out, “the first component of any system of civilian control is to minimize the power of the military.” Objective civilian control achieves this reduction by professionalizing the military, making it politically neutral. This results in the military having the least political power over all civilian groups. At the same time, that essential element of power which is necessary for the existence of the military profession is preserved. A highly professional officer corps is ready to fulfill the demands of any civilian group with legitimate authority in the state.
Indeed, this clearly outlines the limits of the military's political power, without taking into account the distribution of political power among various civilian groups. A further reduction in the power of the military - below the point where maximum professionalism is achieved - would benefit only a particular civilian group and would serve to strengthen the power of that group in its struggle with other civilian groups.
The subjective definition of civilian control implies a conflict between civilian control and military security requirements. This was generally recognized by supporters of certain civilian groups, who argued that the constant danger of war made civilian control impossible.
German political scientist P. Meyer points out that the relationship between society and the army as one of the organizations of society is not a constant value and undergoes changes as a result of the development of society itself. The change in the social role of the army, its “weight” in society is manifested in a decrease or increase in the share of military expenditures in the state budget, the role of “military values” in the life of society, as well as in the prestige of personnel military service, the social influence of the military in comparison with other social groups. P. Meyer, with reference to the American political scientist M. Yanowitz, identifies four types (models) of militarized societies:
aristocratic model “political and military elites” are inextricably linked);
democratic model (“political and military elites” are separated);
totalitarian model (dominance of the “political elite”, which ensures control over society through special units);
model of a “garrison” state (dominance of the “military elite” with reduced influence of the “political elite”).
The Armed Forces are one of the important instruments of policy. But in a civilized society they do not interfere, guided by their own interests, in the political process.
The defense of its corporate interests by the army as a whole is unusual for a civilized, democratic society. This, as far as one can judge from world political history, is rather a feature of unstable political systems in the states of the “third world”. It was there - in Asia, Africa and especially in Latin America - that the armed forces, defending their corporate interests, more than once interfered in the course of political events, while destroying all forms of civilized political order. At the same time, history knows cases of the stabilizing role of the army in society. This is precisely what the example of Chile demonstrates; previously, the army played a similar role during the formation of democracy in post-war Germany, Japan, and South Korea, although the army was American. But nevertheless, it was under its cover that society was able to calmly form new political institutions and regulate economic relations, and engage in the creation of a qualitatively new political system. It was the army during this transition period that ensured order and organized the work of society.
A brief examination of various aspects of the political system testifies to the richness of content and diversity of forms of its expression, the high importance of the creative development of the concept of democracy and its consistent implementation, the creation of such guarantees that would forever exclude any possibility of using power for anti-people, anti-social purposes. At the same time, problems of the effective functioning of the political system of our society require constant improvement of the forms, methods and mechanism of its implementation.