V. Ryzhkov: I― Vladimir Ryzhkov from the temporary studio of the Ekho Moskvy radio station. Today we are working on the first day at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, there are quite a lot of foreigners and foreign topics here, and that’s why I invited Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign Affairs, to my studio. defense policy and editor-in-chief of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs”.

Well? International topics are of great interest, and the first question I would like to ask you is. Putin has just visited Paris, meeting with the new French President Macron. We have such visits now last years It is quite rare for our leaders to travel to the West and meet with Western leaders. What does this visit mean? He says that the normalization of our relations with the West is beginning, probing, testing the water with his foot, when a person tests with his foot before entering the river, cold water or not? Luck or not luck? What does this mean?

F. Lukyanov- Luck - I think you can say so, because the very fact of the visit and the fact that it took place so quickly is good. And for both sides. It was important for Putin, well, let’s say, not to repeat possible mistakes, which were admitted with Trump. I don’t know whether this was a mistake or not, but one can hypothetically assume that if the meeting had taken place immediately after, for example, the inauguration, something might not have gone quite as well as it is going terribly now. But this did not happen with Macron, despite the fact that the parties, so to speak, did not express any sympathy for each other, but rather the opposite. But the president is the president, he won, and the fact that Putin went there, so to speak, to get to know each other, is good.

This is also useful for Macron, because it is very important for him to show that he is a heavyweight.

V. Ryzhkov- Moreover, we now have parliamentary elections very soon, which are vitally important for him.

F. Lukyanov- Yes, he has parliamentary elections. Plus, well, let's be honest, one of his tasks is numerous... He has a very big agenda, difficult, but one of the tasks is to show that France is a foreign policy player, because, frankly, under Hollande, well, France has turned into an accessory German politics. Now there is clearly an attempt to do something different.

As for the normalization of relations, you say, my question in this regard arises from the word itself: what is the norm in our relations?

V. Ryzhkov- The norm is the absence of sanctions, the norm is mutual investment, the norm is the growth of trade, the norm is the growth of mutual trust. This is what I mean by normal.

F. Lukyanov- If this is the norm, then I think that we are extremely far from it. I'm afraid the norm is now a little more modest. The norm is probably maintaining sanctions for an unknown period. The norm is, yes, indeed, an increase in confidence, but only with a very low level. Very low. And the norm is the ability, without much propaganda chatter, to nevertheless resolve individual issues. I don’t know about any common project, I don’t know about it, just like there was a common space a couple of years ago and so on. Alas, this is all in the past, this will never happen, I’m afraid, it’s as if the cycle has passed.

And in this sense, France is a very good partner, because there is an understanding that a certain dead end in the absence of relations is conscious. But so far no one understands how to restore these relations, on what basis to restore them. Why do I say that France may be better than Germany in this case? Because Germany now bears a very heavy burden of European leadership. Germany, even if we imagine that Chancellor Merkel would want to change her policy towards Russia (I’m not sure if this is the case, but if it were), she is forced to primarily focus on intra-European situations.

France is freer in this sense. Plus, well, in France, after all, there is a century-old tradition that Russia is important. In Germany, by the way, strangely enough for us, there is now no feeling that Russia is important. And in this sense, Macron is indeed a very important partner.

V. Ryzhkov- Well, still, there is a feeling, Fedor, do you have a feeling that in addition to the fact that they arrived there on time, Putin arrived there, that this in itself is an important meeting with the new president, was there a specific content there? So, there is a feeling that there were just those small progress that you spoke about, there, on Syria, on Ukraine, the Normandy format, on sanctions? Or is it still unclear?

F. Lukyanov- It’s unclear, we don’t know. We were not told anything. Those statements that were made, they...

V. Ryzhkov- Well, there are general words there.

F. Lukyanov- General words, and absolutely in the spirit of what was expected. Although, I would say, here... Well, this is purely, you know, atmospheric and subjective. It seems to me that the Russian tone has changed in recent months. That is, Russia clearly does not want escalation.

V. Ryzhkov- But Putin (his last phrase at a press conference in Paris) - he said about this: “Let’s fight together for the lifting of sanctions, because this harms us all.” That is, it’s just a different language, it’s a language of, well, I won’t say “reconciliation,” but it’s a language of common sense, at least.

F. Lukyanov- Well, this is the language of common sense, and, most importantly, this is the completely incomprehensible and uncertain situation that has arisen in general, but, in particular, within the Western world. Because, well, after all, Putin flew to Macron literally the next day after Angela Merkel said something that German leaders never said, that not all partners...

V. Ryzhkov- That Europe will, yes, defend itself.

F. Lukyanov: Russia clearly does not want escalation

And in this regard, it seems to me that it is too early to expect any concrete changes. Because, well, let's say Syria. France's task, frankly speaking, is to come back as a player. Because it turned out, after all, an amazing thing in recent years, that Europe and, in particular, France, which had always been there, disappeared. There is America, there is Russia, there is Turkey, but there is no France or Europe. This is the first.

In Ukraine, we’ll see. Macron clearly intends to take over, so to speak, the baton from Hollande, but in a different capacity, because Hollande, well, was there... Again, I don’t want to offend anyone.

V. Ryzhkov- Not as a passive player, but as a more active player, apparently.

F. Lukyanov- Hollande was there because Merkel generously allowed him to be supposedly on an equal footing.

V. Ryzhkov- Yes. But Macron seems to have an ambition, after all, to be more active.

F. Lukyanov- Macron has ambition, and moreover, he has no choice, because if he doesn’t prove... Why was he elected? Because France has been in a state of certain political depression for quite some time. France wants to feel important and influential. There are a lot of internal economic problems there, but besides this there is a role in Europe.

Therefore, in this sense, it seems to me that Putin correctly felt that there was a request for a conversation. After all, for Macron it is necessary to understand the role and reputation of Russia now in Europe. For Macron, this is a plus not in the sense that he is again, as it were, getting closer to Russia. Many in Europe do not consider this necessary or important.

V. Ryzhkov- And in the sense that he is so cool that he can talk to Putin.

F. Lukyanov- Yes, even with such a difficult person as Putin, he is not afraid. Please. Well, in this sense, he achieved his goal.

V. Ryzhkov- Well, it’s very interesting that... Fedor, you and I are very closely following and studying and studying Europe (both you and me). How quickly not only the scenery changes, but how quickly the play itself changes, right? That is, even 3 months ago it all gave the impression of decline and decadence, but now Macron won and, most likely, Merkel will win again, and Europe suddenly begins to play with some kind of steely glare.

So, I have a question: does this mean that Europe will begin now, after all, that this trend towards decline will be replaced by a trend towards revival and that this famous locomotive of two combined Franco-German locomotives will work at full power? Because Macron really gives the impression of a very ambitious, energetic person who wants to be a leader, including the leader of Europe.

F. Lukyanov- Well, I would...

V. Ryzhkov- Or is it too early to say?

F. Lukyanov- I would wait, because... You are right, Macron... What does Macron produce? Macron is impressive. The impression is good. Whether Macron will make anything other than an impression, we don’t know yet.

V. Ryzhkov- Because, after all, impression is a big deal. Now, Trump makes a bad impression, and Macron makes a good impression.

F. Lukyanov- Trump not only makes an impression, Trump, if he wants, will shoot at any country. No, I think that...

V. Ryzhkov- So what will happen to Europe?

F. Lukyanov- I think that Europe is entering now, really... And, by the way, this statement by Merkel is an indirect confirmation. Europe is indeed entering a period of transformation. There was a lot of talk about this. At first they didn’t speak, they pretended that they didn’t need to. Then they started talking, but didn’t know how. Now a combination of factors - the British withdrawal, and this new situation with America, and the rise, and then, after all, the stopping of this so-called populist wave - creates a situation where it is no longer possible... Well, it was possible - time to maintain the inertia of rest. Now it is destroyed. And after the elections in Germany, Europe will apparently begin to make some changes. But it is not yet completely clear which ones. I increasingly hear this mantra from European interlocutors about a Europe of many speeds. Well, to be honest, I... Maybe I, of course, am not as qualified as they are, but I don’t believe in it, because, in my opinion, the European idea only works when there is at least the illusion of equality... And when They say to some countries, “Excuse me, we respect you very much, but you are, after all, second class, and you are third,” well, you understand: it doesn’t work. Therefore, I don’t yet know how Europe will act, but the fact that it is entering a phase of action, not inaction...

V. Ryzhkov- And politicians have ambitions, which is also very important.

F. Lukyanov- There are ambitions, yes.

F. Lukyanov: France wants to feel important and influential

F. Lukyanov- Four.

V. Ryzhkov- Merkel 4 and Macron 1 - they are, after all, now... They have an ambition to change. And the Italian leadership now has the same rhetoric, the Spanish leadership and Juncker have the same rhetoric. For all of them, the rhetoric of retention has now changed to the rhetoric of change.

F. Lukyanov- Yes, that’s true, but at the same time, you’re absolutely right that everything is changing very quickly. We were just in decline, now we are on the rise. It’s not a fact that we won’t be in decline again in 2 years.

V. Ryzhkov- Fedor, then the question is about Russia, especially since we are working at the economic forum. If the assumptions that we are now very carefully making about new trends in Europe suddenly turn out to be reality, how should Russia behave with this new Europe, with Merkel’s Europe with new legitimacy, Macron’s new legitimacy, and so on?

F. Lukyanov- This means that Russia needs to behave carefully. Respectfully, I think. Stop convincing yourself that it’s all lost... How is that? The plaster is removed and the client leaves. But at the same time, clearly understand that Europe will not and should no longer be in the role in which it was, say, the previous one and a half to two decades, that is, some kind of starting point, or something. Not because there are our internal 150- or 200-year-old rituals “We are Europe, not Europe.” This is another matter. But the world has simply changed so much that even a renewed Europe will no longer be the center of the world.

V. Ryzhkov- But it will be one of the centers.

F. Lukyanov- One... Well, that’s the point, one of. And accordingly, Russia needs to treat it as one of the important centers, as a source, of course, of cultural and civilizational identity, but this does not mean that we should count on some kind of joint political project - this will not happen for sure.

I think that a lot will depend, of course, on how relations between Europe and the United States develop. Under Trump, after Trump, there will be Trump for a long time, not for long, we don’t know. But the fact that very fundamental changes are taking place there is quite obvious to me.

Another thing is that you don’t need to entertain yourself with illusions, as some here do, that Europe will now rise from its knees, throw off American oppression and turn to us. It won't turn around. Because, excuse me, cynically speaking, just with all the Bolshevik directness, Russia as an opponent, purely instrumentally, is now more useful to Europe than Russia, as it is unclear what, some partner is not a partner. Well, when you are solving a huge number of internal problems, it is good to have some kind of bogeyman, excuse me, on the outside. Well, we are successfully fulfilling this role so far. So, I think that it would be good for us to carry it out less successfully (like this).

V. Ryzhkov- I think we have time left for one question, Fedor, which I cannot help but ask. The fact is that many noticed that Trump managed to meet with all the key world leaders. Well, naturally, he started with Theresa May, then he met, naturally, with his Japanese allies. Then he met Merkel, where there was this famous scene by the fireplace when he did not shake her hand. He met with Hollande and, apparently, will meet with Macron in the near future. He invited Xi Jinping to his ranch in Florida and there he fed and watered him in every possible way.

The only world leader from the “top” with whom he has not yet met is Vladimir Putin. And we now expect that the meeting will finally take place, apparently at the G20.

This is the question, Fedor, for you. What should we expect from this meeting, given what we already know about Donald Trump as president, right? And how should we behave in this situation, preparing for this meeting? What would be your recommendations as an international relations expert?

F. Lukyanov- So, my recommendation is very simple: you need to understand the context. Trump, whatever he wants... Whether he wants something from Russia or not... It’s generally difficult to understand him, he has 7 Fridays a week quite often. But even if we assume that he is for Putin with all his soul and would like to merge with him in his arms, he cannot do this. Just look at the effect that the visit, Lavrov’s modest visit to the White House, had. The tsunami is simply political and almost washed away Trump. It’s even difficult for me to say what might happen after the meeting with Putin.

The problem, our problem, is that we have become, due to various circumstances (objective and subjective), Russia has become a factor in the American internal political struggle. And this is the worst situation, because this is a situation that we cannot influence. That's their business. And the fact that Russia came out like this and became such a battering ram against Trump does not add anything to us, it absolutely narrows the space for both him and us. Therefore, I would not expect anything from this meeting, or rather, God willing, if after this meeting impeachment charges are not finally brought against him. Because, again, looking at the consequences of Lavrov’s visit to the White House, I no longer rule out anything.

V. Ryzhkov- Fine. Thank you. In my studio... I remind you that I am Vladimir Ryzhkov, we are working at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, and we talked with Fedor Aleksandrovich Lukyanov, chairman of the presidium of the Council on Foreign Defense Policy, editor-in-chief of the magazine "Russia in Global Affairs", one of the most interesting and profound Russian international experts.

F. Lukyanov- Thank you.

V. Ryzhkov- Thank you. And we will be heard on the air.

https://www.site/2014-01-31/predsedatel_prezidiuma_rossiyskogo_soveta_po_vneshney_i_oboronnoy_politike_fedor_lukyanov_o_vozmozhn

"I don't want to predict a civil war, but..."

Chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Fyodor Lukyanov - about a possible civil war in Ukraine and a war between Russia and NATO

In Ukraine, the hottest stage of the confrontation between the authorities and the opposition has ended. The government has changed, an amnesty law has been adopted. However, this is not enough for the protesters. Calls for early parliamentary and presidential elections. Meanwhile, Viktor Yanukovych went on sick leave. The smoke from the barricades cleared. It's time to take stock and make predictions. Our interlocutor is the chairman of the presidium of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, editor-in-chief of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs” Fyodor Lukyanov.

“Yanukovych is less evil than any other alternative”

Fedor Aleksandrovich, the formal reason for the intensification of anti-state protests throughout Ukraine is the “January 16 laws” on tightening responsibility for mass riots, seizure of institutions, and the like. However, the Ukrainian government comments that these laws are in line with European standards. How true is this?

Firstly, both the Russian and, in this case, the Ukrainian sides are being a little disingenuous in this kind of issue. Indeed, those measures that are enshrined in law exist in Western countries. But usually they take all the most stringent measures from us and put them together. Formally, each of these measures corresponds to the political practice of a particular country. But in fact the spirit of these legislative measures is much stricter than any of those referred to. It turns out to be some kind of manipulation.

Secondly, in Western countries these laws have existed for a long time. They are accepted by society. Therefore, there is some agreement about them. In Ukraine, these laws were adopted on the fly, during a political crisis. The most important thing: a considerable part of the population questions the legitimacy of this government. And this government is on the move adopting laws that are openly aimed at protecting it from any attacks from society. Therefore, it is impossible to compare the situation in Western countries and in Ukraine. If such laws had been adopted a long time ago, and Yanukovych himself had enjoyed undeniable authority, then one could say that the laws of January 16 correspond to Western norms.

“For Putin, interfering in the affairs of Ukraine is an absolutely pointless exercise. There will be no shame, but no results.”

- Then who does the Ukrainian government take its example from?

With the Russian one, this is obvious. But it seems to me that she somewhat underestimates the differences that exist between the political culture and the situation in Ukraine and Russia.

Is this poor judgment? Or is it an intention: to provoke a harsh reaction, and then use force to crush the protest?

I believe that in today's Ukrainian politics there is a great element of spontaneous action. This can be seen throughout the crisis. Therefore, most likely, they did not take into account that events could go according to a completely different scenario.

At the just held Russia-EU summit in Brussels, Putin once again stated that the Russian Federation will not interfere in the affairs of Ukraine. Do Putin’s statements correspond to reality, and is the Russian side really neutral in the Ukrainian conflict?

I think that Putin is disingenuous in this statement. But there really will be no open intervention. For one simple reason. Russia once, and Putin personally, already interfered in the affairs of Ukraine. This was in 2004. Putin traveled to Kyiv and then actually participated in Yanukovych’s election campaign. We know the result: he lost. For Putin, this was the most painful defeat. Therefore, he has a clear idea that trying to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine and influence them is an absolutely pointless exercise. There will be no shame, but no result. Therefore, I think that Russia really will not participate in this conflict openly. We have leverage in the form of promised money, which has begun to be allocated, but this can be suspended.

Can we say that Putin and his entourage are clinging to Yanukovych? After all, it is clear that he, as a politician, has already been written off, his rating is low. It is unlikely that he will be voted for in a national election. Maybe today we should contact someone else, someone from the opposition?

Yanukovych is a legitimate president. There is no other legitimately elected president in Ukraine. As for elections, it is pointless to predict them in Ukraine. I would not say that Yanukovych no longer has any chances. And Putin, as I think, does not cling to Yanukovych, but in the current situation Yanukovych lesser evil than any other alternative. It may be anti-Russian forces who may try to do what Yushchenko did. Or there may be a leadership that will not be able to control anything at all, that is, there will be political chaos in the country. I think that Russia is not satisfied with either option.

Isn't civil disobedience in Ukraine an example and a call to action for the Russian opposition? Is the “export of revolution” scenario playing out? Are there prerequisites for this in Russia?

I think exporting revolutions is a scary thing. The situations in Ukraine and Russia are different. I believe that there is no direct relationship in this regard.

“People are simply fed up with this system”

You spoke about a special Ukrainian political culture. Surely its epicenter is the western regions: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnitsky, Rivne, Lutsk, etc. And it’s understandable why they are protesting – due to historical heritage. But why did the same actions take place in Dnepropetrovsk, Chernigov, Poltava region, that is, the eastern lands?

In Russia, they greatly exaggerate the geopolitical factor, which, of course, exists. But the situation does not end there at all. Ukraine is currently experiencing a crisis political system. Yanukovych did not create this regime, but he is its most vivid personification. This is a deeply corrupt and ineffective regime. He is unable to formulate any guidelines national development. And it's getting worse. This has been the case from the very beginning, but over different periods, more skillful politicians have found ways to maneuver within this system. And since the 2000s, the situation has gradually worsened. And under Yanukovych it reached a certain limit. Residents of the western regions are not satisfied with this situation for cultural and historical reasons, but residents of the eastern regions are simply fed up with it. Instead of doing something for the people, the authorities are exclusively engaged in intrigue, stealing and trying to shift their responsibility to someone else. Therefore, there is nothing to be surprised that people of various views, strata, living in different regions are simply fed up with this system, which serves itself, and not the population.

“This is a deeply corrupt and ineffective regime, unable to formulate guidelines for national development. Under Yanukovych, it has reached its limit.”

How do you generally assess the ongoing civil disobedience in Ukraine over the years? How effective is it in terms of improving political and social relations? What is it - forward movement, walking in a circle or retreating back?

I think the most accurate description is walking in circles. There are a number of elements in the Ukrainian protest that command respect: for a long time there was no violence in it. However, now we see that this no longer works. But experience shows that this model of political behavior in general does not change anything. She is forcing the country to mark time. Therefore, the main goal of the events is, first of all, to try to change this political system.

- What about the economy? Standard&Poor's downgraded Ukraine's credit rating. What will happen in the long term?

All investors love predictability. Ukraine demonstrates the opposite. This is another sign that the Ukrainian model is not working. It is obvious that Ukraine is deteriorating economically. As for possible changes, it is difficult for me to say whether they will happen or not. As we see, this has not been possible in all the post-Soviet years.

“Ukraine is a periphery”

Are there any elements of provocation in the escalation of the conflict? If so, who is their “customer”? Who could be behind the killing of protesters and police?

Of course, there is a provocation. But do not confuse cause and effect. There is an objective crisis in the state model, from which it is not clear how to get out. It is clear that there are forces both inside the country and outside that are trying to exploit this crisis. I can’t say who the customer is. These are pointless attempts to speculate on this topic. But the reason for everything is the unsuccessful model that the Ukrainian authorities are trying to implement.

Then how to evaluate the visits to the Maidan by representatives of the State Department, the demands from the American administration to Yanukovych to remove special forces from the streets of Kyiv, to appoint a pro-European government? Is this not an attempt at foreign interference in the affairs of a sovereign state?

This is, of course, interference in internal affairs. But from an American point of view this is normal. They have such a political culture. But, as far as I remember, this was only one case, when Mrs. Nuland, the Deputy Secretary of State, came to the Maidan. I don't remember any other State Department representatives. Victoria Nuland is a special lady, she belongs to the group that ruled foreign policy USA under Bush. Now she, perhaps, does not represent the mainstream of American politics. Although she occupies a high position, so any appearance of her is a definite signal. But, as I said, the United States does not consider it anything extraordinary that it can tell all the countries of the world how to live. They have always had such a political culture, especially in the 20th century, when they became the world hegemon. But if we compare the US intervention in the affairs of Ukraine 10 years ago, during the “Orange Revolution”, and what we have today, then, of course, this incomparable. Then there was a frank attempt to intervene and coordinate the political governance of Ukraine, but now it is a kind of reflexive behavior. Yes, they have a certain pattern: people are fighting for democracy, but a corrupt regime is hindering them. But today Ukraine is not a priority foreign policy USA. They have enough problems without it.

“This is interference in internal affairs. But from the American point of view, this is normal. They have such a political culture.”

Is it possible to say that what is happening in Ukraine is the implementation of a long-standing US geostrategy, which Zbigniew Brzezinski once published in his famous “Great chessboard"? Russian patriotic statesmen are now clearly sitting and rubbing their palms: we said that the United States is getting closer to the heart of Eurasia - and here you go, the result is obvious! Today - Syria, tomorrow - Ukraine, the day after tomorrow - Russia.

Brzezinski is indeed considered a demon in Russia. Therefore, if some kind of political struggle suddenly intensifies in Ukraine, Brzezinski is immediately remembered. He really believes that Ukraine is the key to Russian imperial consciousness: if Russia can no longer influence Ukraine, then the imperial consciousness will gradually disappear. And in principle he is right. But if in the 90s, when he wrote this book, Ukraine was an important geopolitical issue for both the United States and Russia, now the paradox of what is happening is that the passions that are boiling there, except for the participants directly involved in the conflict , no one else in the world really cares. Because today Ukraine is a periphery. World events today are not developing in Eastern Europe, they have shifted to completely different regions of the world - to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the Pacific and Indian Oceans. And this is the difference between the current situation and the mid-90s, when Brzezinski wrote his book.

“Most Ukrainians have no idea what an association with the European Union is”

The Ukrainian opposition explains its actions by its desire for Europe. But is Europe really that attractive today – taking into account its “illnesses,” first of all, of an interethnic, interreligious, civilizational nature? And also taking into account the fate of such “small” countries in the EU as Portugal, Greece, Cyprus? Taking into account the huge expenses that Ukraine will face upon integration into the EU.

The European choice that is being talked about in Ukraine today is an image, not a reality. And I think that it is not connected with the fact that Ukrainians believe that by making this choice they will immediately leave the system that is there now. Most Ukrainians have no idea what association with the European Union is. They have a fairly rough idea of ​​what is happening in Europe. That is, this is not a real choice, but a choice of consciousness.

Of course, the image of Europe is attractive. And in order to strive there, you don’t have to be any kind of “corrupt oppositionist.” It is a natural desire to be part of something that is successful and progressive. What does Russia offer on the other side of the scale? If you leave, we’ll take this away from you, but if you don’t leave, we’ll give you this much money. But for Ukrainians such primitive logic does not work. I can’t understand why the aspirations of Ukrainians are perceived as a betrayal. Another question is that this is not very realistic. Europe is not going to give anything, and the association agreement is an attempt to tie Ukraine to the European Union for an indefinite future with not very clear goals. So that it was. Europe has never said a word that Ukraine has a chance of joining the European Union.

But, by the way, Yanukovych and his government have been convincing citizens for many months that the European course is right choice Ukraine. At the same time, without explaining why we really need this. And then they suddenly made a 180-degree turn: stop, we don’t need this anymore, we need relations with Russia. But that’s not how it’s done. So why be surprised that citizens on the Maidan are now behaving this way? At first, one thing was hammered into my head, and the propaganda was coming from the Party of Regions, and then the same party backtracked. And now Ukrainians have such a mess in their heads. One thing is clear - that now they want something different, they want change. But here a vicious circle appears. They cannot make changes in themselves, but they hope that some external force will arrange these changes for them.

“This is an attempt to tie Ukraine to the European Union for an indefinite future with not very clear goals.”

In Brussels, Putin mentioned a free trade zone between the European Union and the Customs Union. Could Ukraine become a buffer zone rather than a peripheral country?

No, it is assumed that such a zone will cover everything: both the European Union and the Customs Union. Therefore, hypothetically, this may be a way out for Ukraine. They will stop trying to divide it. But in practice this is still a pure utopia. No one is actually going to build this zone. Europeans do not yet take the Customs Union seriously at all. And the Russian government is not able to explain to them that this is serious.

“I don’t see how Ukraine can divide peacefully”

How do you see a political way out of the crisis in Ukraine? The main question is: will it survive as a single state? Some experts argue that the best option for Ukraine – federalization. And some do not rule out dividing it into several states...

We need to cut off the extremes and try to find what unites all Ukrainians. The most important obstacle to this is that today Ukraine is an oligarchic state. There is constant bargaining between different groups influence. This prevents Ukraine from finding a development strategy. How to get rid of this oligarchic regime is not a matter of my competence. As for the federation. Theoretically, this might be some way out. But, firstly, I’m afraid that the moment for such a scenario has already passed. Secondly, to be honest, it’s not very clear how geographically this will happen? Just as it is not very clear how disintegration can happen. I doubt that this can happen through agreements and painlessly.

- That is, the chosen path may well lead to civil war?

I don't want to predict civil war. But the degree of uncertainty is high. In short, I don’t see how Ukraine can peacefully separate. I fear that the costs of such a scenario may exceed any hypothetical benefits.

"Ukraine is an oligarchic state. This does not allow it to find a development strategy"

-In this case, could the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine worsen relations between NATO and Russia?

I don’t think that for NATO, protecting Ukraine from its eastern neighbor is an important issue today. And Russia, I think, understands that in today’s situation it is pointless to drag Ukraine into the Customs Union. Such countries cannot be accepted into associations that were created for a serious integration perspective. On the contrary, Ukraine will destroy the Customs Union from within.

But what about the statements of patriotic geopoliticians that without Ukraine the Customs Union will not become a full-fledged organization?

They just believe that the Customs Union is a revival Soviet Union. But I think it’s high time to move away from such logic. This is irrelevant. By the way, this is Brzezinski’s logic, and our patriots are reproducing it without realizing it. Only with a plus sign. I repeat, today Ukraine is the global strategic periphery.

As Kommersant has learned, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) will change its chairman. Sergei Karaganov, who headed SVOP for 20 years, will leave his post on November 30. The new chairman of the SVOP will most likely be the editor-in-chief of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs” Fyodor Lukyanov.

Sergei Karaganov will leave the post of chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy at the general meeting of the council, which will take place on November 30. As Mr. Karaganov told Kommersant, immediately after this, SVOP will hold a conference “Russia in the World of Power of the 21st Century,” dedicated to its 20th anniversary. “I informed my colleagues about my decision to leave the post of chairman of the council last year,” said Mr. Karaganov. “I explained my decision by the fact that the council turns 20 years old this year, the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs” is 10 years old, and I - 60". According to Mr. Karaganov, the election of a new chairman will be held at a general meeting of the council. At the same time, a rule will be introduced on the need to rotate chairmen.

One of the most likely candidates for the post of chairman of the SVOP, according to Kommersant, is the editor-in-chief of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs” Fyodor Lukyanov. "There are such plans, I am a candidate, but final decision will be adopted only at a general meeting,” Mr. Lukyanov confirmed to Kommersant. According to him, he does not know whether any of the experts intend to compete with him. The current chairman of the council also intends to support Mr. Lukyanov’s candidacy. “Lukyanov is one of leaders of the council, and I believe that he is one of the most worthy candidates,” Sergei Karaganov told Kommersant.

Mr Karaganov's colleagues on the council say he has long wanted to leave his post. “He had long dreamed of leaving the post of chairman, but he could not find a successor,” council member economist Sergei Aleksashenko told Kommersant. Member of the presidium of the council, deputy, also does not see a political motive in the resignation of Mr. Karaganov State Duma from " United Russia“Vyacheslav Nikonov: “Chairmanship of the council is a constant need to look for funding, to carry out some events, I think Karaganov is just tired,” he told Kommersant.

According to Mr. Nikonov, the tasks of SVOP changed over the years and the organization had its greatest influence in the late 90s, during the premiership of Yevgeny Primakov. “In recent years, the council has been less visible, but this is explained by the fact that the number of think tanks today is much larger than it was 20 years ago. At the same time, in recent years, both foreign ministers and presidential assistants for international affairs have taken part in all council assemblies. affairs, so the SWAP has not lost its influence,” Mr. Nikonov told Kommersant. The former head of the Presidential Human Rights Council, member of the SVOP Ella Pamfilova confirmed to Kommersant that Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and former presidential assistant for foreign policy and international relations Sergei Prikhodko regularly attended council meetings. “There was close interaction, first of all, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the opinions of the council members were listened to, and in this sense, the council was popular and influential,” Ella Pamfilova told Kommersant.

A member of the Presidential Council for Human Rights, Chairman of the National Anti-Corruption Committee, Kirill Kabanov, suggested in a conversation with Kommersant that Mr. Karaganov’s departure may be related to his desire to concentrate on the council’s projects on Far East. Indeed, in July, Mr. Karaganov, together with MGIMO professor Oleg Barabanov, presented a report “To the Great Ocean, or the New Globalization of Russia,” prepared for the APEC 2012 summit in Vladivostok. Another Kommersant interlocutor suggested that Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin might want to revive the activities of the council: “Apart from the Congress of Russian Communities, there is nothing behind it, and perhaps Rogozin may be interested in reviving this expert platform.”

In response to US actions

The development and implementation of the presented systems was provoked by unilateral actions of the United States: withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the practical deployment of this system both on the territory and outside the United States, as well as the adoption of a new nuclear doctrine, Putin explained.

The treaty was concluded by the USSR and the USA in 1972, and in 2002, under President George W. Bush, the United States withdrew from it. The document prohibited the deployment of new types of missile defense systems (BMD); countries could have only one such system - either around the capital or in the area of ​​intercontinental ballistic missile launchers (for the USSR - centered in the capital, for the USA - at the Grand Forks base in North Dakota).

The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty early in Putin's presidency. He has repeatedly criticized this decision, especially after it became known that the American side intends to deploy some missile defense facilities in Europe. Russia, when Dmitry Medvedev was president, proposed that NATO share responsibility for security in Europe and create a sectoral missile defense system. However, NATO refused, explaining that it could not transfer responsibility for ensuring its own security to countries outside the alliance.

Numerous attempts to come to an agreement with Washington failed, since they considered Russia weak, unable to revive the economy and armed forces, Putin stated. “All our proposals, precisely all our proposals, were rejected,” the president said.

As a result, two missile defense areas appeared - in Romania, as well as in Poland, where the deployment of the system is being completed, and there are plans to deploy anti-missile systems in Japan and South Korea. The US global missile defense system also includes a naval group - five cruisers and 30 destroyers stationed in areas in close proximity to Russian territory, Putin said.

THAAD anti-missile system (Photo: Leah Garton/Reuters)

The United States and NATO, commenting on the deployment of missile defense in recent years, indicated that it was not directed against Russia, but should respond to threats from the “southern direction.” Experts then explained that the main threats to the West come from Iran and North Korea.​​

The new review of US nuclear strategy, published on February 2, also raises concerns, according to Putin. Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are listed as increased external threats. The document says that the United States will modernize the nuclear triad and develop low-yield nuclear bombs, and a nuclear strike could follow not only in response to a nuclear attack, but also to a strike with conventional weapons.

Impossible conversation

Experts interviewed by RBC note that the president’s current message is tougher than all previous ones on international issues, and surpasses in intensity the famous Munich speech of 2007. Then Putin also spoke about the danger of the US decision on missile defense and warned about retaliatory measures. This is not a second “Munich”, this is a “super-Munich”, not a declaration of the Cold War, but a statement that it is underway, says Fyodor Lukyanov. Putin's message is very tough. So far, the reaction to it in Europe has been restrained, but these harsh words and videos will be heard and seen not only by politicians, but also by citizens, which can have a serious impact on sentiment, including sobering up those who have recently only criticized Russia, says the scientist Director of the German-Russian Forum Alexander Rahr.

Despite the harshness, Putin’s message is an invitation to negotiations, says Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the international committee of the Federation Council. Putin said the same thing: “No, no one really wanted to talk to us, no one listened to us. Listen now." Laying cards on the table in order to let the interlocutor understand that they need to play is a completely normal tactic, counting on the fact that the other side will sober up and go to negotiations, Lukyanov believes.

However, the chances that the United States will be ready to negotiate with Russia after such a message are small, experts say. Putin’s speech will worry European countries that find themselves between two centers of confrontation, Lukyanov predicts.

Second arms race

This “absolutely exceptional speech” will be presented in the West as further evidence of the growing Russian military threat, says Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. The Pentagon said on the evening of March 1 that Putin’s statement in the department did not surprise anyone and all of Russia’s plans had already been taken into account in military planning.

“His speech can be seen as a message to Washington, which indicates a clear deterioration in relations,” The Washington Post reacted. In the tone of the Cold War, the Russian president boiled it down to the fact that the country deserves a place among the world's superpowers, wrote The New York Times.

“Putin’s message is the best gift to the American military-industrial complex. I'm sure the headquarters from Boeing to SpaceX are opening champagne today. There is nothing better for owners of shares in military-industrial complex enterprises than a serious arms race, and it has begun,” says leading expert of the American Atlantic Council Ariel Cohen. "It is more likely that American leadership will interpret Putin's words as an invitation to military competition. The American military-industrial complex is clearly yearning for real work, and Trump and his team have always demonstrated a favorable attitude towards the defense complex,” Lukyanov expects an increase in US military spending.

The US is already preparing

The modernization of the American nuclear triad, including nuclear-powered missile submarines, strategic aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles, is announced in all the latest military plans of the Donald Trump administration. Currently, the backbone of the US ICBM arsenal is the Minuteman III missile. The US nuclear policy doctrine published in early February, which Putin spoke about in his message, proposed to begin replacing these missiles in 2029. In the same doctrine, Washington unveiled plans to invest in new weapons systems, including the low-yield nuclear warhead for the Trident D5 naval ballistic missiles. In addition, it was reported that the United States has already begun a program to create and deploy a new generation of B-21 Raider bombers. ​In the draft military budget for 2018, which Donald Trump signed on December 12 last year, there is an article allowing the Pentagon to begin developing a non-nuclear ground-based cruise missile with a range from 500 to 5.5 thousand km. Since 2010, the US Navy has been developing laser weapons. In 2014, the US Navy reported successful tests of the Laser Weapon System (LaWS) directed energy weapon. All these plans can be revised in the direction of accelerating their implementation, experts say.

“President Putin has made a bet on a powerful breakthrough in the military-industrial complex. We already went through this in the 1950-1980s, and it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. I do not exclude that now Russia will step on the same rake. I doubt that with a GDP 12 times smaller than the US and ten times smaller than the Chinese, Russia has a chance to get ahead of the US and China in this area,” says Cohen.

In 2018, Russia will spend $46 billion on defense, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said at the end of last year. The US military budget for the 2018 fiscal year is $692 billion.

Collapse of the negotiation system

Another result of the demonstration of the latest Russian systems may be the abandonment of the deterrence system that developed during the previous Cold War. “All work to strengthen Russia’s defense capability was and is carried out by us within the framework of existing agreements in the field of arms control, we do not violate anything,” Putin said. The weapons he presented do not, in fact, violate existing international treaties, Alexey Arbatov, an academician and head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, told RBC.

However, experts predict that the presented weapons and President Putin’s rhetoric will not contribute to the negotiation process. Between the United States and Russia, two fundamental documents in the field of arms control are now preserved - the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, concluded in 2010 and valid until 2021, and the open-ended Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. “In three years, the INF and START treaties may become history,” says Trenin. The first will soon expire, and after the fulfillment of the second, the parties have long had claims against each other; given current circumstances, they are unlikely to persist, says Lukyanov.

ALTERNATIVE OPINIONS

The materials posted in this section reflect the private opinion of the authors, which may not coincide with the opinion of management Russian Federation and Embassies.

16.04.2014

Russia without the West? (F.A. Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy of Russia, Editor-in-Chief of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs”)

Historical moments often happen unexpectedly. And the turning points are events that in themselves do not at all claim to be on a large scale. The conflict in Ukraine, which began with Kyiv's refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union, a boring 400-page legal document, has escalated into the near collapse of Ukrainian statehood and an international crisis of the first magnitude.

Change of milestones and Russia

Russia became the main actor. Moscow has actually retreated from the model of behavior that it had been following for almost a quarter of a century—since the late 1980s. Since that time, since the period of wonderful dreams of peace and Europe without dividing lines, at all turns of our history, the preservation good relations with the West remained the most important goal. Even when Russia took steps that clearly contradicted the wishes of Europe and the United States, it left room for maneuver to minimize damage to ties with them. The Western direction of foreign policy and foreign economic contacts was considered as a guarantee of the security, development and well-being of Russia.

In 2014, Moscow behaved differently. Having ignored all requests, appeals, warnings, threats of Western countries, Moscow included Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. Until the last moment, literally before Vladimir Putin’s speech with an extraordinary message Federal Assembly On March 18, many politicians, diplomats, and commentators in the West could not believe that this would happen. Even when a referendum was already in full swing on the peninsula, the result of which seemed inevitable, the version continued to circulate that the head of the Russian state was simply raising the stakes, wanted to use the will of the population of Crimea as a trump card in some kind of geopolitical bargaining. Everyone is too accustomed to the fact that Russia never goes to the very end in defending its interests, as it understands them. And when this did happen, the reaction of the United States and Europe boiled down to the desire first of all to punish Russia, regardless of how justified its wishes and reasoned position were.

"Seven" versus "Eight"

Very symbolic in this context is the behavior of Moscow’s partners in the G8, which many consider the most influential political forum in the world. So what should such a structure do when a major political crisis breaks out in the world? That's right, meet and discuss ways to resolve it. Where can this be done if not in a meeting, the meaning of which has always, since its formation 40 years ago (then still in the “five” format), has been the opportunity to have a frank and direct conversation. Moreover, Russia now presides over the G8. An excellent reason to convene an emergency summit in order to sort things out face to face. And ideally, agree on something - in an informal setting it is always more convenient.

However, the opposite happens. The first (I emphasize - the first!) reaction of seven countries to the aggravation of the situation around Crimea and to Moscow’s position was: we will not come. Even for the planned summit meeting in Sochi - in early June. And then the G7 makes a series of statements condemning Russia and threatening it, and then begins to impose sanctions.

Let us leave aside the fact that the Chairman of the G8 is threatened with sanctions of the same kind that were applied to dubious countries and leaders. More precisely, not on the sidelines, but on the conscience of those who, in large and complex politics, are guided by a standard set of templates. Something else is more important.

The habit of resolving crisis situations through pressure rather than consultation is ineradicable. And this is a consequence of developments after the Cold War. With the end of the USSR, balance disappeared in the world. The winning side believed that it could now establish a new order, which it considered the most correct and effective. However, experience shows that the result is increasingly turning out to be the opposite. Pressure and attempts large countries Forcing others to do what they want only creates more confusion, not order. Vice modern world- a total imbalance of everything: capabilities, interests, ideas about each other. And this is already affecting us at every step.

Broad view of the world

The main lesson that Russia, apparently, is learning from what is happening is that the world is not limited to the West. Moreover, it has become truly heterogeneous and diverse; centralization and anyone else's domination are simply impossible. And since many new influential players have emerged, each of which requires a special approach, it is inappropriate to approach the world system based on the indispensable priority of relations with the West. This is a serious turn for Russia, because for centuries its view remained Western-centric.

What does this mean in practice? Six years ago, three American researchers from the University of Berkeley published an article in the National Interest magazine entitled “A World Without the West.” Globalization and the emergence of new centers economic growth and developments are leading to the emergence of a much more dispersed world than before, the authors argued. Fast developing countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and a number of others are establishing connections with each other. This is not happening against, but bypassing the United States and Europe. In the depths of what was previously called the “third world”, the beginnings of general ideas are being formed that do not coincide with Western ones. For example, about the inviolability of sovereignty or that human rights are not necessarily primary relative to the law of society or the state. And this is not just a defense of not entirely democratic regimes from the reproaches of the West, but a different political culture.

Scientists have concluded that there are three scenarios in which the United States could respond to the emergence of a “world without the West.” The first is a tough confrontation, attempts to force others to accept the rules established by the West. The second is the other way around: serious concessions to developing countries on economic issues in order to win their sympathy. However, they themselves recommend the “live and let live” model. In Cold War parlance, “peaceful coexistence.”

Modern America, it seems, is not yet eager to follow such advice. True, Barack Obama took hesitant steps to reduce the ideological intensity of US policy, but it did not work; circumstances constantly return him to his usual course. Something else is interesting here.

Russia, which with the light hand of Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O'Neill was once included in the BRIC (later became BRICS), has always clearly contrasted in its ideological baggage with the rest of the members of this group. India, China, Brazil, South Africa are united by anti-colonial (he predominantly anti-Western) pathos. Russia also has a very complex attitude towards the West, as is known, but completely different. For Russia, the Old World is its cradle, the source of cultural and religious identity, we are connected with Europe by common roots, which does not negate the rich history of conflicts and rivalries.In this, however, Russia is no different from other European states, most of which in the past fought with each other, sometimes brutally, to the point of destruction.

Be that as it may, at the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian view remained Euro- and Western-centric - in contrast to the other growing BRICS powers. The entire conversation, including the dispute about ideas and values, was conducted with Western countries. Even the rejection of liberal trends that has emerged in the last two years, the insistence that Russia is the bearer and custodian of traditional values ​​and approaches, represented a game, albeit a counterattack, on the Western conceptual field. In other words, we could not imagine our “world without the West”. And it was difficult to imagine that this would change. Now, however, events are occurring that can cause major changes.

Unexpected effect of sanctions

The referendum in Crimea and the entry of the peninsula into the Russian Federation provoked a nervous reaction from the West; Europe and the United States began to impose sanctions against Russia. At the beginning, there was talk of political and symbolic measures, but since Moscow is not going to change its line of behavior in any way, and perhaps will be more active in Ukraine, economic confrontation cannot be ruled out. The effect may be unexpected.

Much has been said before about Russia’s turn to Asia, to the East; Vladimir Putin recently called it Russia’s main priority for the 21st century. If the West begins economic and political pressure on Russia, tries to introduce restrictions in the spirit of the Cold War (investment, technology, financial markets, access to credit sources, curtailing contacts, closing markets, etc.), then for Moscow “ a world without the West” may simply become an objective reality. And then reorientation to other centers of economic influence will turn out to be a forced reaction to it.

There is no need to create illusions, this is quite a significant shock. Firstly, it is worth honestly admitting that Russia is not accustomed to interacting on equal terms and fully with countries that until relatively recently were considered the world’s political periphery, objects rather than subjects. In Soviet times, we acted as patrons and fought with the United States for influence on the states of Asia, Africa, Latin America. In the post-Soviet years, at first they were essentially ignored, then they tried to restore lost connections by touch.

Secondly, there is no doubt that the developing world, where the American position is quite strong, will be actively advised not to deal with Russia. It’s difficult to ban now, the situation has changed a lot compared to what it was 25-30 years ago, but nevertheless, Western leverage should not be underestimated.

Thirdly, speaking, for example, about China, which in the current situation seems to be a natural alternative, we cannot ignore the other side. No matter how positive Russian-Chinese relations may be, Russia is now significantly inferior to China economically and is increasingly connected with it politically. Beijing is willingly ready to support Moscow (though informally) and provide financial and economic assistance, but at the cost of this fast growth Russian dependence on China. The interests of the two countries do not coincide in everything, but Russia will have to increasingly take Chinese opinion into account when making decisions.

Turn to real multipolarity

Moreover, it is important for Russia to activate a wide variety of ties besides the traditional West in order to balance its new positions. In recent years, as Moscow has gradually gained international influence and acted from an increasingly independent position, many parts of the world have hoped for Russia's return as an independent player. Not necessarily opposed to America and Europe, but at least balancing them.

Most of the world's population is tired of the lack of an alternative. Russia will not wait for official recognition of its actions in Crimea, but it can also firmly count that in the event of further aggravation with the West, it will not be able to organize any complete blockade. Developing states now completely refuse to march in formation, but are trying to use the discord of the grandees to strengthen their own positions. The statement of Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner, who supported the Crimean referendum, is noteworthy - of course, comparing the Russian integration of the peninsula with the desire of Buenos Aires to take the Falkland Islands under its jurisdiction. African countries are sympathetic to Moscow's steps.

Iran stands apart. He expects a rapid growth of ties with Russia, which until now have been limited by the Kremlin’s reluctance to escalate with the West. The entire Middle East palette could be transformed if Russia begins to oppose the policies of the United States and its allies to an even greater extent than it has hitherto. In general, there is an opportunity to capitalize on the noticeably increased reputation that Moscow has gained during the Syrian conflict and due to its adherence to principles on this issue. Many Arab states were testing whether Russia intended to act in the region as a counterweight to America, which had lost some of its authority, but until recently they did not find decisive support. Now Russia's intentions may change.

It is clear that the West remains the most powerful and influential global player; it has potential that no one can replace. First of all, in the scientific, technological, educational sphere. And the cultural attractiveness of Europe for Russia and the whole world can hardly be overestimated. However, Russia has no intention of entering into conflict with the West or isolating itself from it. The point is simple and clear that interaction should not be on any terms and at any cost.

Russia is and will be the power of European culture, at least as long as it is inhabited by Russians and other peoples who have lived here for centuries. And this will not change if the EU tries to put pressure on Russia. But in the world of the 21st century, without strong ties with the West, it is pointless to count on success. So, if sanctions are introduced, we should be grateful for them. They will help that reorientation that is long overdue. For the world, Russia’s rejection of the narrow Western-centric view will mean the emergence of full-fledged multipolarity, which no one will be able to ignore.

LAST MESSAGES

03/13/2019 - British view on Russian-British relations: interview with the British Ambassador to Moscow L. Bristow to the Kommersant newspaper 03/12/2019

Russia and the UK will today launch one of the rare joint initiatives - a cross-year of music. Kommersant correspondent Galina Dudina took this opportunity to ask the British Ambassador in Moscow Laurie Bristow how deep the crisis is in relations between the two countries and whether the British see prospects for stabilization. However, there are still few of them.

04/04/2018 - First head of the OPCW: “Everyone knew that there were no chemical weapons in Iraq” (BBC material)

Every anniversary of the Iraq War, Jose Bustani feels sadness and resentment. Fifteen years later, the Brazilian diplomat remains confident he could have helped prevent what he describes as "a futile invasion and its horrific consequences." Bustani, now 72, was the first chairman of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), created in 1997 to oversee the ban on the use of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles.

09.02.2018 -

On December 22, 2017, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson made a working visit to Russia, who held talks with Sergey Lavrov on a wide range of issues on the bilateral agenda and current international topics. Following the discussions, both ministers at a joint press conference spoke about the need to restore mutual trust and that the current state of relations between Moscow and London cannot be called satisfactory. Hence the mutual desire for more effective interaction in the international arena, especially since the status of Russia and Great Britain as permanent members of the UN Security Council obliges this, as well as for the restoration of norms in the sphere of bilateral relations. B. Johnson's visit was the first visit by a British foreign secretary to Russia in the last five years. What is the reason for the lack of normal relations between Russia and Great Britain in recent years and what do the results of the negotiations held in Moscow allow us to hope for?

21.12.2017 -

LONDON, December 20 – RIA Novosti. British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson is traveling to Russia amid extremely cold relations between the two countries, but is counting on dialogue on issues of combating terrorism, cyber threats, and cooperation in preparing for the World Cup. Among other topics that the British minister in Moscow would like to discuss is Syria and ways to restore bilateral relations. On Wednesday, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that a meeting between the Russian and British ministers is scheduled for Friday, December 22. Currently, the political dialogue between Moscow and London actually comes down to technical, mainly visa issues. It is difficult to predict whether Johnson's visit will change this situation. In a number of cases, the British demonstrate a constructive attitude - the recent trip to Moscow by Deputy Head of the British Foreign Office Alan Duncan was relatively successful. At the beginning of December, the Deputy Minister discussed with First Deputy Head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Vladimir Titov cooperation between the two countries to ensure security on the eve of the World Cup, as well as bilateral issues. However, in recent years, under the Conservative governments of David Cameron and Theresa May, Russian-British relations have been going through difficult times. The crisis arose due to disagreements over the situation in Ukraine and around Crimea, as well as Syria. Political dialogue has been almost completely curtailed. London unilaterally froze useful and popular bilateral formats of intergovernmental cooperation: strategic dialogue in the “2+2” format (ministers of foreign affairs and defense), energy dialogue high level, the work of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Investment and the Committee on Science and Technology. In fact, regular consultations between foreign policy departments have been stopped.

05/22/2017 - General elections in Britain: about Russia - either nothing or bad (BBC Russian Service)

The material is published at: http://www.bbc.com/russian/features-39952589 Yuri Vendik BBC Russian Service The main topics of the June general elections in Britain are Brexit and socio-economic policy. But Russia is also mentioned in the election platforms of the main parties, mainly as a potential threat and problem in international politics.

02/16/2017 - Global rebellion and global order. The revolutionary situation in the world and what to do about it - report by the Valdai Discussion Club

Many years after the student unrest that swept almost the entire world in 1968, activist of the then movement Daniel Cohn-Bendit recalled the essence of what was happening: “It was an uprising of the generation born after the Second World War against the society that the military generation had built after 1945 " The riot manifested itself in different ways, depending on the location. In Warsaw and Prague, people protested against the communist regime, in Paris and Frankfurt they denounced bourgeois-conservative dominance, in San Francisco and New York they were outraged by militarism and inequality, and in Islamabad and Istanbul they rejected the power of the military. All were united by a reluctance to live in the old way. “We were the first media generation. The media played a big role because they transmitted a spark of burning hostility, and it ignited one country after another,” recalled Cohn-Bendit. Almost half a century later, the world is again living in “parallel time.”

08/02/2015 - Iranian precedent and Ukrainian knot (Published in RG (Federal Issue) N6730 dated July 22, 2015)

Igor Ivanov (President of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1998-2004)). The coordinated actions of Russia and the United States largely ensured the achievement of agreements on Iran.

08/02/2015 - Is diplomacy powerless? (Published in RG (Federal Issue) N6730 dated July 22, 2015)

Fyodor Lukyanov (Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy). Today there is no need to talk about the summer lull, but still, with the approach of August, organized political life quiets down. (Which, of course, does not exclude surprises, for which, as we know, August is often very rich.) Why does international politics go on a conditional vacation until the fall? The main events of the past season are the Minsk process, the rise of the Islamic State, the worsening of the Greek debt crisis and the successful completion of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. Each of these phenomena has its own background and logic, but together they form a completely holistic picture of global politics. Ukraine, Greece and Iran are the three faces of modern diplomacy.

02.06.2015 -

I already had to write that, having emerged from the Cold War, Europe lost the post-war world. The continent faces the threat of strategic degradation - either a cartoonish repetition of the military-political split into opposing blocs, or a period of restless uncertainty.

02/23/2015 - Europe: Is it possible to avoid defeat? (Published in RG (Federal Issue) No. 6605 dated February 19, 2015)

All of Europe, winning in cold war, the world loses after her. And it enters the next phase of international relations, divided and again on the brink of confrontation, or even a big war. Is there still a chance not to lose? I think yes. But first we need to understand how we got to this life.