The engineering assault units of the Red Army are Soviet cuirassiers of the Great Patriotic War. History and ethnology. Data. Events. Fiction

After working near the village of Gura-Bikului and studying documents, I couldn’t get out of my head the assault battalion lying on the outskirts of the village, consisting exclusively of officers: from junior lieutenant to colonel. And if, say, with officer penal battalions there are a lot of mysteries, but everything is more or less clear, then somehow I have never encountered assault battalions before. Here's what we managed to find:
Pykhalov and others
"Penal battalions. On both sides of the front."

A year after order No. 227, another type of penal units appeared in the Red Army - separate assault rifle battalions.

As you know, on December 27, 1941 I.?V. Stalin signed the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 1069ss on state verification (filtration) of Red Army soldiers who were captured or surrounded by enemy troops. In pursuance of his order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs No. 001735 of December 28, 1941, army collection and transit points (MPPs) were formed and special camps were organized.

In the midst of the Battle of Kursk, on August 1, 1943, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order No. Org/?2/1348 “On the formation of separate assault rifle battalions,” which prescribed:

“In order to provide the opportunity for command and control personnel who were for a long time in territory occupied by the enemy and did not take part in partisan detachments, with arms in hand, I order to prove their devotion to the Motherland:
1. Form by August 25 of this year. from contingents of command and control personnel held in special camps of the NKVD:
The 1st and 2nd separate assault rifle battalions are in the Moscow Military District, the 3rd separate assault rifle battalion is in the Volga Military District, the 4th separate assault rifle battalion is in the Stalingrad Military District.
The formation of battalions is carried out according to staff No. 04/?331, numbering 927 people each.
The battalions are intended for use in the most active sectors of the front.
…
3. The length of stay of personnel in individual assault rifle battalions is set to two months of participation in battles, either until they are awarded an order for valor in battle or until the first wound, after which the personnel, if they have good certifications, can be assigned to the field troops to the appropriate command positions - commanding staff." (Russian archive: The Great Patriotic War: Battle of Kursk. Documents and materials March 27—August 23, 1943. T. 15 (4 4) Comp.: Sokolov A. M. et al. M., 1997. P. 70 71).

Subsequently, the formation of assault battalions was continued. Their combat use was, in principle, no different from penal battalions, although there were some peculiarities. Thus, unlike penal prisoners, those who were sent to assault battalions were not convicted and deprived of their officer ranks:

"6. The families of personnel assigned to battalions from special camps of the NKVD shall be provided with all the rights and benefits determined by law for the families of commanding personnel” (Ibid. P.71).

If in penal battalions (as in penal companies) permanent personnel occupied all positions, starting with platoon commanders, then in assault battalions the permanent composition included only the positions of battalion commander, his deputy for political affairs, chief of staff and company commanders. The remaining positions of the middle command staff were occupied by the “stormtroopers” themselves:

“Appointment to positions of commanding staff, both junior and middle, should be made after careful selection of commanders from special contingents” (Ibid.).

The period of stay in the assault battalion was two months (in the penal battalion - up to three months), after which the personnel were restored to their rights. In practice, this often happened even earlier.

What percentage of Soviet military personnel who returned from captivity served in assault battalions and were generally subject to any kind of repression? Here are the results of a test of former prisoners of war held in special camps between October 1941 and March 1944:

Total received—317?594
Checked and transferred to the Red Army - 223281 (70.3?%)
to NKVD convoy troops - 4337 (1.4%)
in the defense industry—5716 (1.8%)
Departures to hospitals - 1529 (0.5%)
Died—1799 (0.6%)
In assault battalions - 8255 (2.6%)
Arrested— 11,283 (3.5%)
Continue to undergo testing—61?394 (19.3%)
(Mezhenko A.? V. Prisoners of war returned to duty...Military Historical Journal. 1997. No. 5. P. 32).

A similar ratio remained in the fall of 1944:

“Certificate on the progress of verification of former encirclements and prisoners of war as of October 1, 1944.
1. To check former soldiers of the Red Army who are in captivity or surrounded by the enemy, by decision of the State Defense Committee No. 1069ss dated 27.12.41. Special NKVD camps were created.
Inspection of Red Army soldiers in special camps is carried out by the counterintelligence departments “Smersh” of the NPO at the special camps of the NKVD (at the time of the decision these were Special Departments).
In total, 354–592 people, including 50–441 officers, passed through the special camps of former Red Army soldiers who emerged from encirclement and were released from captivity.
2. Of this number, the following were verified and transmitted:
a) to the Red Army 249?416 people.
including:
to military units through military registration and enlistment offices 231?034 —»—
of which 27?042 are officers —”—
for the formation of assault battalions 18?382 —»—
of which 16 are officers? 163 —”—
b) to industry according to the regulations of GOKO 30749 —»—
including— 29 officers —»—
c) for the formation of escort troops and security of special camps 5924 —»—
3. Arrested by Smersh authorities 11556 —”—
of which 2,083 were enemy intelligence and counterintelligence agents —”—
of which 1,284 were officers (for various crimes) —”—
4. Departed for various reasons over the entire period - 5347 went to hospitals, infirmaries and died —"—
5. They are in special camps of the NKVD of the USSR in check 51?601 —”—
including— officers 5657 —»—
…
From among the officers remaining in the camps of the NKVD of the USSR, 4 assault battalions of 920 people each are formed in October” (Zemskov V.N. GULAG (historical and sociological aspect) Sociological Research. 1991. No. 7. P. 4 5).

Since the cited document also indicates the number of officers for most categories, we will calculate the data separately for privates and sergeants and separately for officers.

Sent privates and sergeants:
to military units through military registration and enlistment offices—203,992 (79.00%)
to assault battalions - 2219 (0.86?%)
in industry—30,720 (11.90%)
arrested - 10272 (3.98?%)
A total of 258,208 privates and sergeants passed the test.
Officers sent:
to military units through military registration and enlistment offices—27,042 (60.38%)
to assault battalions—16,163 (36.09%)
in industry—29 (0.06%)
arrested - 1284 (2.87%)
In total, 44?784 officers passed the test.
Thus, among privates and sergeants, over 95?% (or 19 out of every 20) former prisoners of war were successfully tested. The situation was somewhat different with the officers who were captured. Less than 3?% of them were arrested, but from the summer of 1943 to the fall of 1944, a significant proportion (36?%) were sent to assault battalions. Thus, it was assumed that there was more demand from an officer than from an ordinary Red Army soldier.

No one has spoken about them since the war. They did not correspond to the picture appearance of a front-line soldier of those years. The Liberator is an exhausted figure in a gray overcoat, tiredly smoking a rolled-up cigarette on a tree stump...

No one has spoken about them since the war. They did not correspond to the picture appearance of a front-line soldier of those years. The Liberator is an exhausted figure in a gray overcoat, tiredly smoking a rolled-up cigarette on a tree stump near the dugout. Or a crowd of people running to attack. Apparently, ideological workers had to show the winner as a peasant - a peasant and a worker, forced to leave his children and wife, his machines and land. That's who defeated Hitler! Downtrodden by the Stalinist regime, a simple man of the hammer and sickle. In the films of the late eighties of the last century, a warrior, almost without ammunition, confronted the enemy. This is clearly an exaggeration. After all, the Germans also came to the territory of the Union not only in combat vehicles. History proves that the invaders used carts to move around and had an advantage in weapons and numerical strength.

Today's attitude towards the victorious warrior has turned, as they say, 180 degrees. He is presented as some kind of ninja terminator.

In reality, of course, the paratrooper or marine was in good health. This is explained by the widespread sports movement in the pre-war country. But both writers and directors completely lost sight of one of the elite teams of those times.

History of the emergence of SHISBr

It immediately became clear that it was impossible to fight as before. This issue became especially acute during the assault on various types of defensive structures.

In this regard, special units were created in England, America, and Germany, which were assigned the corresponding responsibilities. The spring of 1943 is the date of birth of the ShISBr, whose main function was the destruction of enemy barriers. They were built from concrete and buried, taking into account the landscape of the area; the approaches to them were often mined. A thorny fence was erected around them. City ruins, a basement, a sewer hatch - this is a small list of what the retreating enemy turned into a bunker. Of course, storming the penalty boxes and shouting “hurray” here only led to numerous losses. The headquarters understood this. The idea arose from the military actions in Verdun. In 1916, assault sapper groups fought in the German army for the first time. They were armed differently from other soldiers and had special training behind them. Only the Soviet command remembered this. The first brigade was formed on the basis of the engineering and sapper troops of the Red Army. It was there that there were specialists with the necessary knowledge.

First there was reconnaissance. Its task was to study enemy installations, their locations, what their cover was, the location of obstacles and mines, gun installations and machine gun nests. After the reconnaissance operation, the battalions entered into battle. There were no more than five of them in the brigade. The selection for these brigades was strict. The strongest were selected, those with a quick reaction. After all, you had to carry a steel breastplate, a set of explosives, grenade ammunition, and backpack flamethrowers. In addition, the weapons included anti-tank rifles, light machine guns, and bottles of Molotov cocktails. Therefore, athletes and physically strong young people were selected. Before going on missions, intensive training was carried out: training in hand-to-hand combat, knife throwing, marksmanship, terrain orientation, and subversive activities. One of the tasks was the destruction of the most powerful fortresses of the Great Patriotic War, military equipment and manpower of the enemy.

How the hostilities took place

Previously, corridors were made in the minefields. Then the special detachment cut off the Germans from the infantrymen protecting them. And only after this did flamethrowers and explosives enter into hostilities; in cities they knew how to appear “out of nowhere,” with lightning speed, and with ingenuity. Since 1944, the number of brigades has increased to 20, they were reinforced with companies of flamethrower tanks. But at the beginning of creation, an opinion was formed about their omnipotence. Impossible tasks began to be set, which resulted in large losses. The ShISBr was powerless against a tank counterattack and artillery fire. Therefore, in December, regulations were created prescribing when and where special forces can be used. After the attack aircraft, sapper companies cleared the corridor for the advancing troops. Mine detector dogs were used. After this, sappers began clearing mines in the liberated area.

The most famous military operations of the engineering assault brigade were Berlin, Koenigsberg and the fortifications of the Kwantung Army. Without the action of special forces, the losses on the part of the Soviet troops would have been much greater, and many battles would have taken a protracted nature. In 1946, the brigade's fighters were completely demobilized. Later, the ShISBr was gradually disbanded. The command considered that such a unit was not needed in the era of nuclear weapons. In fact, if anything will survive an atomic explosion, it will be underground bunkers and forts. And only specially trained fighters can cope with them. For many years, the special forces, which made a great contribution to the Victory of 1945, were forgotten. And with it, a unique page in martial art was closed.

Assault brigades of the Red Army: how elite Soviet troops fought

During the Great Patriotic War, the Germans showed themselves to be masters of military engineering. Their obstacles in the blitzkrieg were considered impregnable. But the sapper-engineering assault units of the Red Army, created in 1943, broke into the most complex German fortified areas.

German historians, speaking about the war with the USSR, like to repeat that the Russians turned out to be excellent students in military affairs and surpassed their teachers - soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht. As an example, the engineering and sapper assault battalions of the Red Army are given, which broke into the impregnable fortified areas of Germany.

However, the use of technical solutions to achieve military advantage has been taking place since the time of Alexander Nevsky. The capture of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible can also be attributed to the asset of Russian military engineering.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, it was believed that the Soviet sapper troops fully met the requirements of the time. They were equipped with the necessary means to overcome obstacles, in particular, IT-28 tank bridge laying vehicles, a pontoon fleet, and equipment for electric barriers. There was even a special swimming bag for IPC horses. At the same time, these battalions were auxiliary units of the Red Army and were not equipped with the necessary road transport.

Panzergrenadiers from the SS Totenkopf

Military engineering played a huge role in the war. Having broken through our fronts with tank formations, the Nazis quickly built obstacle courses around the encircled Soviet units, including minefields.

The time required to overcome them turned out to be sufficient to destroy the advancing Red Army infantry with dense machine-gun and mortar fire.

Soviet fortified areas were stormed by German special forces - panzergrenadiers, the basis of which was the Wehrmacht motorized infantry.

Of these types of German units, the most famous is the SS Totenkopf (Totenkopf) division of the 1939 and 1942 models, which included a special sapper battalion. In the arsenal of enemy sappers and attack aircraft there were special means for destroying our pillboxes and bunkers, but most importantly, they were specially trained to take layered defensive structures.

Beginning of the war

Without effective anti-personnel defense, equipped with engineered barriers, the German blitzkrieg would have been a journey of fascist tanks across the vast Russian expanses. That is why the Red Army armies that found themselves in the cauldrons, finding themselves reliably cut off from the rear, surrendered after grueling bombings and depletion of resources.

Our sapper troops were bled dry at the very beginning of the war, being busy building a new fortified area on the border with Poland. They were among the first to find themselves in the line of fire, lacking heavy weapons and vehicles for evacuation.

The remaining engineering units perished, covering the waste of the main units, blowing up bridges and leaving minefields. Sappers were often used as infantry. The headquarters responded to this situation as quickly as possible under those conditions, and on November 28, 1941, it issued an order banning the use of sappers for other purposes. In fact, in the autumn of the first year of the war, the sapper troops had to be created anew.

Strong in spirit and body

The headquarters not only quickly controlled military operations, but also carried out analytical work. The command noted that the fighting engineering troops, due to their specific nature, were a formidable force. For example, the famous “Pavlov’s House” in Stalingrad was defended for 56 days by 18 sappers, commanded by Sergeant Yakov Pavlov. The commander of the 6th German Army, Field Marshal von Paulus, was also captured by sappers of the 329th Engineer Battalion and soldiers of the motorized rifle division.

On May 30, 1943, the formation of the first 15 assault engineering brigades, which were tasked with breaking through German fortified areas, was completed. The fighters of these units were physically strong young men, under the age of forty, well versed in technology. Basically, these units were formed on the basis of already fighting sapper battalions, which showed themselves well in battle. In August 1943, assault engineer brigades arrived at the front.

Hard to learn, easy to fight

Before going to the front, soldiers of assault engineering brigades underwent a special course. They were especially carefully taught how to throw grenades and covert movement.

For example, Captain M. Tsun, commander of the 62nd assault battalion of the 13th ShISBr, fired live ammunition in classes in which future sappers crawled on their bellies.

As a result, his fighters were not inferior to the best instructors. Attack sappers were also trained to make quick dashes over rough terrain with heavy ammunition loads of grenades and explosives. Of course, they taught hand-to-hand combat techniques.

Attack sappers have mastered the tactics of joint attacks with infantry. To do this, they compiled a detailed map of the German defense and calculated its weak points. The soldiers of these battalions went into battle wearing steel breastplates, wearing padded jackets underneath. For this they were sometimes called armored infantry.

“The brigade’s personnel are special sappers, attack aircraft with bulletproof vests, wearing steel helmets, all armed with machine guns,” recalled the head of the engineering troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, General Galitsky. “They are intended to fight together with the infantry and must participate in breaking through the defense: in the destruction of pillboxes, bunkers, machine gun nests and enemy OP...".

In addition to machine guns, many Red Army attack aircraft were armed with backpack flamethrowers, machine guns and anti-tank rifles, which they used as large-caliber rifles. A reinforced set of grenades was also required. Having made openings in the defense lines, the assault sappers were immediately withdrawn to reserve.

Defeat of Germany

The Germans considered Konigsberg an impregnable fortress, but the city fell in a matter of days. Soldiers from engineer assault battalions broke through to fortified areas and blew them up with powerful explosive charges. Nikolai Nikiforov in his book “Assault Brigades of the Red Army in Battle” gave the following example: “... to blow up a reinforced concrete shelter in the Parshau area, a charge of 800 kg of explosives was required. The garrison of 120 people surrendered after the explosion.”

Here is another quote from the same book:

“In the battles for Berlin, the 41st Regiment burned 103 buildings. The experience of using backpack flamethrowers once again gave reason to assert that they are one of the effective means of fighting in the city, due to their lightness, the ability to approach attacked objects through hidden access and the high efficiency of flamethrowing.”
The headquarters considered the engineer-sapper assault brigades to be the elite of the Red Army.

In recent years, the authorities have been talking only about the inadmissibility of falsifying the history of the Great Patriotic War, but in fact they have not lifted a finger to move from words to deeds. As Hollywood films about the war were shown on our central channels, where our soldiers are portrayed as a weak-willed mass, capable of attacking only if there is a machine gun behind them, this is how they are shown. The most annoying thing is that many modern domestic films are made according to a similar scenario. It seems that either the directors of these films simply do not know the real history of the Great Patriotic War, or are simply outright lying, keeping silent about the numerous exploits of our soldiers and officers. One of the brightest pages in the history of the Second World War is the so-called Assault Engineer Reserve Brigades (SHISBR), which were directly subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and instilled fear in the Nazis with their very appearance.

The need to create assault battalions arose in 1943, when it finally became clear that a strategic turning point in the war was taking place in favor of the Red Army. Our troops launched an offensive on almost all main fronts, and new offensive engineering formations were urgently needed to break through the powerful defensive fortifications of the Nazi troops. It was decided to create such formations on the basis of already existing engineering units, and by May 30, 1943, by reorganizing them, 15 ShISBr were created. Each brigade consisted of a headquarters, command, control and engineering reconnaissance companies, several assault engineer battalions and a company of mine detector dogs.

Since the tasks assigned to the assault battalions were the most serious, they did not take just anyone there. All candidates for the ShISBr had to have real combat experience, excellent physical health and be no older than 40 years. The fighters of the assault battalions were equipped with much better and more modern uniforms than ordinary soldiers of the Red Army. By the way, if you start looking through photographs of military chronicles, you will easily be able to distinguish the ShISBr fighters in them. Many of them have light machine guns, sniper rifles, machine guns, and flamethrowers in their hands. Some of the stormtroopers were even dressed in body armor (armored cuirasses), which was even more rare at that time. Often the soldiers hid their body armor under protective overalls and thus literally drove the Germans who were shooting at them crazy. The Germans fired cartridge after cartridge, but could not stop the ShISBr fighters. There is even an interesting story on this topic. Allegedly, one of the fighters dressed in an armored cuirass ran out of cartridges, and he, grabbing an empty shell from a German Faustpatron, beat about ten Germans to death with it. They never understood why their weapons had no effect on the Soviet soldier. Although this may not be a story at all, but a situation that actually happened.

Naturally, in order to solve the most difficult tasks, the fighters of the assault battalions required, in addition to good uniforms and weapons, special training. The fighters spent a lot of time studying the basics of hand-to-hand combat and throwing grenades. We learned to quickly and silently overcome various types of obstacles. Some units also had their own know-how in the field of preparing soldiers for upcoming battles. For example, in the 13th ShISBr the 62nd battalion was commanded by Captain M. Tsun, who during training used live ammunition to create a more realistic battle environment.

However, despite all this, the first battles of the ShISBr cannot be called too successful. The reason is the incorrect use of assault battalions. When storming fortified German positions, they were used as ordinary rifle units, accordingly receiving their own offensive zone. And since the ShISBr often had neither artillery support nor heavy small arms, and besides, the infantry simply could not keep up with their lightning attacks, they suffered heavy losses during attacks and were not always able to complete the task assigned to them. A typical example of how irrationally the forces of the ShISBr were used in the first months after its creation is the unsuccessful assault on height 191.6 near the Kireevo station.

The enemy's defense consisted of three lines of trenches with firing points and dugouts. In front of the first trench there was a carefully camouflaged anti-tank ditch, covered by minefields and barbed wire. The right flank of the German defense rested on a river, and the left flank on an almost impassable swamp. The attack plan was as follows: first, the assault battalion was supposed to storm height 191.6 and wait there for the approach of tanks and the main group of troops. Having overcome all three German trenches in a short time and, as a result of a difficult battle, occupying the heights, the ShISBr fighters took up defensive positions and began to wait for the approach of tanks and infantry. However, the tanks were never able to get through the anti-tank ditch, and the attack of the infantrymen advancing after them was accordingly choked. It also failed to break through the right and left flanks of the German defense. As a result, the fighters of the ShISBr essentially found themselves surrounded on all sides by the enemy, who, having learned about this, began to transport additional forces to this area. Having suffered heavy losses (236 people) at the cost of incredible efforts, the ShISBr fighters still managed to get out of the encirclement. This once again proved that using assault battalions as ordinary rifle units is far from the best option. Despite excellent training and skills in taking enemy fortifications, such attacks were beyond their power.

Only in mid-December 1943 was the order of tasks that the ShISBr fighters needed to perform clearly defined. Their main task remained the blocking and destruction of enemy strongholds and fire installations. However, now the adopted regulations stipulated in detail that a breakthrough through heavily fortified enemy areas required heavy means of suppression and destruction, a detailed action plan, interconnected actions with infantry and artillery support. It was established that before attempting to break through the fortifications, it was first necessary to capture the main strongholds and nodes of the enemy’s defense. Before the capture, the assault battalion was divided into three components - the assault group itself, the obstacle fencing group and the support group. All this made it possible to significantly reduce personnel losses and increase the efficiency of various combat operations.

Also, ShISBr fighters were often used as tank destroyers. Stealthily sneaking up behind enemy lines, they blew up up to a dozen enemy tanks and returned just as quietly. Their tasks were not limited to this; SISBr fighters also performed engineering duties, that is, they cleared mines along particularly dangerous routes for Red Army columns or carried out road and bridge work.

However, the assault battalions gained real fame during the battles for East Prussia. The Germans carefully prepared for the appearance of the Red Army - this area of ​​​​Germany was essentially one large defensive structure. This was especially true for the fortified city of Königsberg (present-day Kaliningrad). Who knows how the operation to storm it would have ended if the Red Army had not included the ShISBr, because it was largely thanks to their participation that the assault was successful. For the assault on Koenigsberg, the command prepared special tactics, the main active force of which were the fighters of the assault engineering brigades. All brigades and battalions were previously divided into small assault groups, which included three or four sappers, one or two flamethrowers, a tank and about ten machine gunners. Under the cover of the tank's armor, flamethrowers and sappers advanced to the building where the firing point was located. The flamethrowers hit the embrasures, preventing the enemy from firing, while the sappers set up explosives. The machine gunners fired at the windows of the upper floors of the buildings, thus covering the tank and sappers. After detonating the explosives, machine gunners entered the building through the opening created by the explosion and destroyed the last centers of resistance. A similar experience was also used by the ShISBr during the assault on Poznan and Berlin.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War and the beginning of the war against Japan, assault brigades established themselves well in the Far East. To achieve this, the SISBr had to significantly change its tactics due to specific local conditions, but despite this, the fighters again showed their best side, once again confirming their professionalism and versatility. After the end of hostilities against Japan, most of the ShISBr, unfortunately, were disbanded. And a few years later this type of troops disappeared completely.

Thus, it is obvious that the reserve assault engineer brigades and the assault battalions included in them made a very significant contribution to the outcome of the Great Patriotic War. It was thanks to their experience and skills that they managed to take many impregnable German outposts, both inside the Soviet Union and later, during the liberation of Poland and the capture of Germany. The ShISBr was perhaps one of the most combat-ready units of the Red Army during the war, and their most important quality is their incredible versatility, the ability to complete almost any given task, from clearing terrain to storming any, even the most complex, enemy fortification. And it becomes very disappointing that very few people in our country know about the existence of these brigades, since they are practically not written about in the media and neither documentaries nor feature films are made, for some reason preferring to talk more about the disadvantages of the war, forgetting about its real heroes. If you are intrigued by this topic and want to learn more about the actions of the ShISBr during the Great Patriotic War, then I recommend reading I. Moshchansky’s book “Engineer Assault Units of the RVGK.” It describes in detail the history of the creation of such units and many glorious victories of attack aircraft.

Typical staffing structure of a separate assault rifle battalion.
Battalion commander (lieutenant colonel/major) and his deputies:
- deputy commander for political affairs (major);
- deputy commander for combat unit (major);
- assistant battalion commander for economic affairs (major/captain);
- head of the quartermaster supply (captain);
- chief of artillery supply (senior lieutenant);
- head of the financial unit (senior lieutenant);
- senior clerk (sergeant).
The battalion headquarters included:
- chief of staff (major);
- 1st assistant chief of staff (captain);
- 2nd assistant chief of staff (captain);
- head of the chemical service (senior lieutenant);
- senior clerk (sergeant).
A rifle company (three in a battalion) of 156 people each included:
- company management;
- three rifle platoons (31 people each);
- a platoon of three 50 mm mortars (11 people).
A company of machine gunners of three platoons (31 people each).
Anti-tank rifle company: 1st anti-tank rifle platoon and 2nd anti-tank rifle platoon (18 anti-tank rifle units and 48 people).
Mortar company (76 people): four mortar platoons (three 82 mm mortars and 16 people per platoon) and a communications and intelligence department (10 people).
Machine gun company: three machine gun platoons (4 Maxim machine guns each and 28 people per platoon).
Platoon of 45 mm guns (2 guns and 17 people).
Sapper platoon (9 people).
A platoon of foot scouts (34 people).
Communications platoon (22 people).
Medical platoon (13 people).
Transport platoon (25 people).
In total, the battalion has up to 927 personnel.
NOTICEABLE DIFFERENCES IN THE ARMAMENT OF THE “VARIABLE COMPOSITION” OF PENAL BATTERIES AND ARMY PENALTY COMPANIES.
Alexander Pyltsyn is the author of the book of memoirs “Penalty strike, or how an officer’s penal battalion reached Berlin” (Pyltsin Alexander Vasilyevich, senior lieutenant, then captain. Since the summer of 1944 - commander of a rifle platoon in the 8th separate penal battalion of the 7th Army 1- of the Belorussian Front. In May 1945 - captain, commander of a rifle company of the 8th separate battalion as part of the 447th rifle regiment of the 397th rifle division of the 61st Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. Awarded three military orders. Was wounded three times. In the Red Army member since July 1941, took part in hostilities since January 1944). He wrote with indignation about the authors of modern publications who do not find “differences between front-line officer penal battalions and army penal companies.”
At the same time, in the memoirs of this real combat officer, and not a literary and cinematic “veteran,” about the recruitment of a penal battalion, it is constantly emphasized that the “variable composition” of a penal battalion consists exclusively of different categories of punished officers. So Alexander Vasilyevich Pyltsyn writes: “I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that our battalion (penal battalion) was constantly replenished with new weapons in sufficient quantities. We already had the new PPSh assault rifles, which were not yet widely used among the troops, instead of the PPD. We also received new anti-tank rifles PTR-S (i.e. “Simonovskie”) with a five-round magazine. In general, we never experienced a shortage of weapons. I am talking about this because it was often stated in post-war publications that “penalties” were sent into battle without weapons or were given one rifle for 5-6 people, and everyone who wanted to arm themselves wanted the speedy death of the one who got the weapon.
As military officer Vladimir Grigorievich Mikhailov (guard captain, commander of the 66th Oashr from December 1942 to May 1945, wounded four times, awarded four military orders) said many years after the war: “In army penal companies, when their number sometimes exceeded a thousand people; there were cases when they simply did not have time to bring the required amount of weapons, and then, if there was no time left for additional armament before completing an urgent combat mission, some were given rifles, and others were given bayonets from them.”
The penal battalions, with their “variable composition” of officers, were well armed.

The 5th separate assault battalion, created in August-September 1943, participated in the following operations in the territories of the Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk regions and the Republic of Moldova.

On the night of September 26, 1943, in the sector of the 203rd Infantry Division, 40–45 kilometers north of Zaporozhye, the Dnieper River had already been crossed by soldiers of the 333rd Infantry Division and a bridgehead on the right bank had been captured. From the Zaporozhye farmstead “Petro-Svistunovo” the bridgehead captured by the 333rd Infantry Division was clearly visible. It had a width of up to 1000 and a depth of up to 600 meters. The commander, Major General Danilov, ordered the 203rd Infantry Division to help the 333rd Infantry Division expand the captured bridgehead and cross the river. Dnieper near the Petro-Svistunovo farm (Zaporozhye region) on two motor ferries and boats. On September 28 - 30, 1943, the 5th Oshbn, then subordinate to the 203rd Infantry Division, crossed the bay (the width of the river in this place reached 3 km) and began combat operations to expand the bridgehead on the right bank of the river. Dnieper in area x. "Vovnigi" and x. “Thunderstorm” (territory of the Dnepropetrovsk region). The 5th assault battalion advanced in the center of the 203rd Rifle Division units storming the bridgehead. On September 29, the enemy sent against the attackers: aviation, artillery, up to 2,000 soldiers (partly in armored personnel carriers and vehicles) and 40 tanks, of which 15 were heavy. The 5th Oshbn had very heavy losses. For expanding the bridgehead in the area x. "Vovnigi" and x. “Thunderstorm” (right bank of the Dnieper River) battles took place from 09/28/1943 to 10/05/1943 (see “Map 1” “Photo Album”).
The evacuation of the wounded and dead soldiers of the 5th Oshsb was carried out by medical instructors of the 254th medical battalion of the 203rd infantry division (p/p 22048) and the 419th medical battalion of the 333rd dt. (p/p 18893). If possible, the wounded and dead were transported across the river. Dnieper (to the left bank) and taken out to x. Ternovka, s. Petro-Svistunovo, p. Petro-Mikhailovka (then Krasnoarmeysky/Sofievsky district, Zaporozhye region):
- Volnyansky district, Petro-Mikhailovsky s/s, village. Petro-Mikhailovka. Number in the VIC - ZU380-08-640;
- Volnyansky district, Petro-Mikhailovsky s/s, village. Petro-Svistunovo. Number in the VIC - ZU380-08-648;
- Volnyansky district, village. Ternovka (2 km northwest of the Dneprostroy highway, which is now called the village of Pridolinovka, Ternovsky village). The number in the VIC is ZU380-08-187.
Those who died on the “Vovnigovsky bridgehead” and remained on the battlefield were subsequently reburied in:
- Dnepropetrovsk region, Solonyansky district, village. Vovnigi, civil cemetery. Number in the VIC - ZU380-04-321;
- Dnepropetrovsk region, Solonyansky district, village. Voyskovoe, village center. The burial number in the VMC is ZU380-04-253.

The command staff of the 5th Oshbn:

Kolnosheev Andrey Fedorovich, born in 1916, lieutenant colonel, commander of the 5th Oshbn (at the beginning of September 1943).
Kantaria Datiko Sandrovich, born 1920, captain, (commanded briefly, until his death on 10/01/1943).
Nikitin Sergey Grigorievich, 1905. Major, acting. O. commander of the 5th Oshbn (he was seriously wounded on 10/01/1943 during a battle in the area of ​​the Vovnigi village - the bank of the Dnieper River, north of the city of Zaporozhye.)
Ptashkin Ivan Fedorovich, born in 1901 Lieutenant Colonel, commander of the 5th Oshbn (October 1943).
Stepanov Mikhail Kirillovich, 1903. Lieutenant Colonel (December 1943 - September 1944)
Tatur Anton Bronislavovich, 1911. Major, deputy commander of the 5th Oshbn for combat unit (October 1943 - August 1944)
Belanov Georgy Nikiforovich, born in 1914. Major, Chief of Staff (at the beginning of October 1943).
Yarokurtsev Ivan Pavlovich, born in 1919 Major, Chief of Staff (at the beginning of August 1944). / senior lieutenant, assistant chief of staff for the operational unit of the 5th Oshbn (as of 10/02/1943).
Musienko Anatoly Stepanovich, 1913. Senior lieutenant, platoon commander (from August 1943 to March 1944).